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Recently, the lack of action in addressing climate change and its adverse effects has been 
at the centre of attention worldwide. Raising to the challenge requires massive 
investments and the current levels of finance are far from adequate. This is a particularly 
pressing issue for developing countries, because they are at the highest risk of danger. 
However, these countries have not yet succeeded to attract enough private capital due to 
various macro risks associated with investments in these countries. Blended finance seeks 
to raise to these challenges as it seeks to leverage private finance for sustainable 
development investments in developing countries through various instruments offered by 
development financiers. The new Paris Agreement on climate change embodies a similar 
idea as blended finance but uses a different name for it – climate finance mobilization. 
However, the Paris Agreement does not define how climate finance, including private 
equity, should be mobilized into low-emission and climate-resilient investments and the 
Agreement does not include explicit references to the use of blended finance. Thus, I 
explore how well the substance of the Paris Agreement’s climate finance mobilization 
aligns with that of blended finance. To this end, I explore legal instruments concerning 
blended finance, blended finance principles. These principles are explored because they 
bring up notions that are critical for the fulfilment of the objectives of private equity 
investors and for the success of blended finance. However, because these principles are 
non-binding, it must be established whether they can be expected to be applied in blended 
finance investments. After examining blended finance principles, I proceed to examine 
risks associated with private equity investments in developing countries and low-income 
countries in particular. Building on this, I examine how well blended finance instruments 
available for private equity investors accommodate different macro risks such as 
regulatory risks, financial/macroeconomic risks and political/institutional risks. Lastly, I 
determine gaps in protection left by blended finance instruments by paying attention to 
particularly regulatory risks. My study combines different research methods including 
legal dogmatics. With regard to macro risks, my research builds on Yescombe’s 
classification of risks and uses other economic literature. The conclusion of my thesis is 
that whereas blended finance accommodates some macro risks in developing countries, 
macroeconomic conditions specifically must be strengthened in the poorest countries to 
make blended finance a promising alternative for private equity investors. 
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Viime aikoina ilmastonmuutoksen torjuntaan tarvittavien toimien riittämättömyys on 
saanut runsaasti huomiota maailmanlaajuisesti. Ilmastonmuutoksen torjunta tarkoittaa 
massiivisia investointeja ja nykyisten investointien riittämättömyys on ilmeistä. 
Köyhimpien maiden on arvioitu olevan erityisen haavoittuvaisia ilmastonmuutoksen 
vaikutuksille, mutta nämä maat eivät ole saaneet osakseen tarpeeksi yksityistä pääomaa 
runsaiden makrotason riskien olemassaolon vuoksi. Yksi mahdollinen keino vastata 
näihin haasteisiin on nk. sekarahoitus (eng. blended finance). Sekarahoitusinstrumentein 
pyritään mobilisoimaan yksityistä rahoitusta ml. yksityistä pääomaa kehittyvien maiden 
kestäviin sijoitusmahdollisuuksiin. Pariisin ilmastosopimus tähtää samankaltaisiin 
tavoitteisiin kuin sekarahoituskin, mutta käyttää tästä eri nimeä, nimittäin 
ilmastorahoituksen mobilisointi. Kuitenkaan Pariisin sopimus ei määrittele tapoja, joilla 
ilmastorahoitusta ml. yksityistä pääomaa tulisi mobilisoida kestäviin investointeihin eikä 
se myöskään viittaa sekarahoitus-käsitteeseen. Tämän vuoksi tutkin, kuinka hyvin nämä 
kaksi eri käsitettä sopivat yhteen tutkien myös, koskevatko ne kokonaan tai osittain samaa 
substanssia. Tätä varten tutkin sekarahoitusta koskevia oikeudellisia instrumentteja, 
sekarahoitusperiaatteita. Nämä periaatteet ovat tärkeitä sen vuoksi, että ne pitävät 
sisällään useita seikkoja, joiden huomiointi on tärkeää pääomasijoittajien tavoitteiden 
täyttämisen ja sekarahoituksen onnistumisen kannalta. Koska nämä suositukset ovat 
kuitenkin ei-sitovia, tutkin, voidaanko niitä olettaa sovellettavan 
sekarahoitusinvestoinneissa. Tämän jälkeen jatkan tutkimusta avaamalla, mitä riskejä 
kehittyviin maihin tehtyihin pääomasijoituksiin on tavanomaisesti liitetty. Analysoin, 
kuinka erilaiset sekarahoitusinstrumentit, joita pääomasijoittajien on mahdollista käyttää, 
pienentävät makroriskejä kuten sääntelyriskejä, makroekonomisia riskejä sekä poliittis-
institutionaalisia riskejä kiinnittäen huomiota siihen, mitä makroriskejä 
sekarahoitusinstrumentit jättävät auki. Näistä riskeistä keskityn erityisesti sääntelyriskiin. 
Tutkimukseni hyödyntää erilaisia tutkimusmetodeja, ml. lainoppia, mutta makroriskien 
osalta se rakentuu Yescomben riskiluokittelulle ja hyödyntää muuta taloudellista 
kirjallisuutta. Tutkimukseni johtopäätelmä on se, että vaikka sekarahoitus pienentää 
erilaisia makroriskejä, erityisesti makroekonomisen ympäristön vahvistamista tarvitaan 
köyhimmissä maissa pääomasijoituksen mobilisoimiseksi kehitysmaihin. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Climate change and investment 
Climate change has recently become a hot topic not only on an international plane but 
also in finance peers, and for a good reason. We know that climate change has 
catastrophic consequences for people’s livelihoods, human life, and biodiversity.1 
Whereas climate change threatens both developed and developing countries, developing 
countries are the most vulnerable for the adverse effects of climate change. Climate 
change is dangerous already now, and it is getting far more dangerous in the decades to 
come taking forms of, inter alia, extreme weather conditions, droughts, prolonged periods 
of heat, heavy downpour and the rise of sea levels.2 These phenomena cannot be avoided 
without drastic changes in global financial flows. Nevertheless, data indicates that the 
current volumes of finance are really far away from keeping the global warming within 
safe limits.3 There is a consensus that the current level of action is not enough to keep 
climate change under control,4 and the latest tracking data available suggests that with the 
current pace of climate action the global temperature will rise approximately 3.2 degrees 
of Celsius by year 2100.5 But how drastic changes are needed in the financial sector to 
keep climate change manageable? The recent reports from the OECD and New Climate 
Economy (NCE) estimate that the global infrastructure investment needed from 2016 to 
2030 to limit the global temperature rise under 2 degrees Celsius is approximately US$ 6 
trillion a year.6 These amounts wildly exceed the capacity of public funding.7  
 
1 IPCC 2018, p. 10 estimates that even limiting the rise of global temperature from 2 degrees Celsius to 1.5 
degrees Celsius will reduce the impacts of climate change on biodiversity and ecosystems. The IPCC also 
projects climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security, and 
economic growth to increase when the global temperature raises from 1.5 degrees Celsius to 2 degrees 
Celsius (p. 11).  
2 Wuebbles 2018, p. 15–16. 
3 Climate Policy Initiative 2015, p. 10.  
4 Bodle et al. 2016 p. 9 refers to the probability of keeping the rise of global temperature under 2 degrees 
Celsius, let alone in 1.5 degrees Celsius. These estimates were based on the assessments of Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) handed in before the Paris conference.  
5 See, for example, UNEP 2019, p. XIII. 
6 OECD 2017, p. 92–93. The OECD estimates that annual investments of US$ 6.3 trillion are needed in 
energy, transport, water and telecommunications sectors between 2016 and 2030 to sustain economic 
growth, even if governments take no further action on climate change. The New Climate Economy 2016, p. 
24 also states that annual infrastructure investment needs to be approximately US$ 6 trillion. The 
assessment includes investments in built infrastructure such as urban, transport, water, waster, 
telecommunications, and energy systems, but not natural infrastructure (p. 120). See also McKinsey & 
Company 2016b estimation that annual infrastructure investment of US$ 3.3 trillion is needed until year 
2030 if the world wants to keep up with projected GDP growth stating that this investment need could 
increase by up to US$ 1 trillion annually to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goals (p. in brief).  
7 Governments alone cannot address climate change because neither the actions nor the wealth of 
governments alone are enough to keep the climate change under control. 
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Climate change does not pose a threat only to life in its various forms, but it also threatens 
investments as a regulatory risk posing danger also to physical assets and revenue 
streams. Despite the effects of climate change vary by region, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that in total the net damage costs of climate 
change are likely to be significant and increase over time.8 Although estimates differ, one 
thing is certain: climate change concerns leave no investor intact either. Climate change 
may affect the bottom line through increasing energy and carbon costs and make 
previously viable businesses unviable.9 The risk posed by climate change for investors is 
widely acknowledged and increasing regulation is expected among investors as countries 
are incorporating their climate pledges made under the new Paris Agreement on climate 
change into their national regulations and policies. For this reason, climate change and 
the regulatory framework surrounding it are not something investors should ignore. 
In spite of dystopian outlooks, and uncertainty surrounding future climate and 
environmental regulations, climate change also brings opportunities, which are not only 
compatible with the Paris Agreement but also encouraged by its treaty text. The Paris 
Agreement has interesting implications for private sector investors in the form of climate 
finance mobilization which seeks to leverage private investment into low-emission and 
climate-resilient development in developing countries by using public development 
finance as a catalysator. This type of finance combining public/development finance and 
private finance has been called as blended finance. It covers different types of finance 
(debt, mezzanine, equity) and uses a number of instruments (e.g. guarantees, grants) that 
seek to rebalance risk-return ratio for private sector investors. Private investments are 
primarily, if not entirely, driven by profit so investments where risks are out of line 
compared to possible profits often fail to attract enough investments. In essence, blended 
finance seeks to leverage private finance to new markets by making investments in these 
countries more attractive for private sector investors. 
Among private sector investors are private equity (PE) investors, who buy (usually a part 
of) a company (portfolio company), make improvements to it to increase its value, and 
then exit the portfolio company. Bringing private equity and venture capital (VC), which 
is one form of private equity, into the blended finance scene is not only needed from the 
point of view of the Paris Agreement: it also paves the way for PE/VC investors to access 
 
8 IPCC 2007, Summary for Policy Makers, p. 17.  
9 IIGCC, p. 6. 
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new markets with the world’s fastest growth rates being among the first to profit from 
enormous growth potential10. Blended finance also enables private investors to benefit 
from the experience of development financiers in emerging markets. The Paris 
Agreement is significant from the viewpoint of financing low-emission and climate-
resilient development and implies a critical role for providers of development finance. 
Development financiers such as development banks and development finance institutions 
(DFIs) function as catalysators of private finance into investments in the poorest 
developing countries, which without development finance would be too risky for most 
private investors to consider. Now also institutional investors, private equity funds and 
venture capital are engaging in blending.11 
Blending development finance with private equity nevertheless raises several questions. 
Do blended finance instruments actually address those risks that in the past have made it 
hard to attract private finance into developing countries? How effective these instruments 
are in addressing risks generally associated with foreign investments in poorer developing 
countries such as low-income countries? What engaging in blended finance means from 
the viewpoint of PE/VC investors: what are the pros and cons of engaging in blended 
finance and which risks are left unaddressed by blended finance instruments? What are 
the most prominent blended finance instruments for PE/VC investors keen on impact 
investing? What this all has to do with the Paris Agreement? To these questions I will 
provide answers in my research. Although blended finance is not a panacea, it addresses 
some concerns12 of private equity investors in developing countries.  
1.2 Research questions and their relevance 
The new Paris Agreement on climate change puts heavy weight on the role of finance in 
tackling climate change. However, the Paris Agreement leaves the sources, channels and 
 
10 See, for example, Dickinson p. 1 referring to an African experience of Celtel telecommunications 
company. Out of the Least Developed Countries, many of which are also low-income countries, a great 
majority are located in the sub-Saharan Africa. Various economic analyses indicate that the economic 
growth is the strongest in the sub-Saharan African countries. Nasdaq lists Guyana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, 
Bangladesh and India as the world’s five fastest growing economies. Out of these countries Guyana’s 
economy is projected to grow by 33.5% in 2020 and during four-year period of 2018–2021 impressive 
16.3%. (Information from 24 August 2019). 
11 OECD 2018, p. 62. 
12 Barriers for leveraging private equity/venture capital investments in developing countries have been well-
studied. International Finance Corporation 2018, p. 42 provides a brief list of overcoming these barriers 
referring to contract enforcement and investor protection, financial markets offering exit options for PE 
investors and different sources of capital, compliance with international business standards, appropriately 
enforced and transparent legal regime relevant for PE industry and intellectual property, as well as capacity 
for innovation. 
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instruments from which this finance should be mobilized undefined and does not even 
detail how this should be done. This is problematic given that climate finance, i.e. finance 
for the purposes of combating climate change and its adverse effects, should be mobilized 
at an unprecedent scale and speed. Moreover, it is clear that private finance is desperately 
needed as public finance will not be adequate to achieve the objectives of the Paris 
Agreement and academic research indicates that the actions under the Paris Agreement 
are clearly not in par with its key objectives. Mobilization of private finance, too, is 
lagging behind from what is needed to make the Agreement’s key objectives a reality. 
Indeed, obtaining the objectives of sustainable development goals (SDGs) generally 
requires cumulative investments of approximately US$ 2.5 trillion per annum for 
developing countries alone.13 However, investments in developing countries have often 
been perceived very risky while risk-return ratios have been unattractive for private 
investors. This is a problem blended finance seeks to address and to this problem I take a 
private equity investor perspective in this research. 
The need for leveraging private finance into low-emission and climate-resilient 
development and the inadequacy of public finance make blended finance a concept worth 
examining. The Paris Agreement does not explicitly mention the term ‘blended finance’ 
but rather uses the term ‘climate finance mobilization’. This warrants further attention 
and examining whether ‘climate finance mobilization’ and ‘blended finance’ govern the 
same substance matter. This might have implications for PE/VC investors and how these 
investors’ perspective is considered in the cases of climate finance mobilization. 
Considering PE/VC investors’ perspective in blended finance investments concerns 
particularly commercial viability, an issue that is highlighted in legal instruments 
regulating blended finance, blended finance soft law. This brings us to my research 
questions. 
As my first research question I will examine whether the Paris Agreement’s term ‘climate 
finance mobilization’ implicitly refers to blended finance. If the terms ‘climate finance 
mobilization’ and ‘blended finance’ govern the same substance matter, this could have 
consequences for the consideration of blended finance soft law when private finance is 
mobilized for climate-friendly investments by development financiers (DFIs, MDBs). 
 
13 UNCTAD 2014, p. xi. 
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Because legal instruments on blended finance have yet taken only softer norms, I will 
consider blended finance soft law. My second research question examines blended 
finance soft law’s application in the area where the terms ‘climate finance mobilization’ 
and ‘blended finance’ govern the same substance matter. As my second research question 
I will examine whether the soft law on blended finance can be expected to be actually 
applied by development financiers in the area where blended finance and climate finance 
mobilization govern the same substance matter. My second research question differs from 
the first question in that it seeks to provide an answer to the question when will the 
relevant non-binding blended finance soft law actually be applied. It examines the 
practical challenges that stem from the ‘soft’ nature of blended finance soft law. These 
challenges are considered from the perspective of development financiers, development 
finance institutions and multilateral development banks, due to the scope of my research.  
The reason why I wanted to research blended finance soft law is because taking blended 
finance soft law (‘blended finance principles’) into account in blended finance operations 
is vital from the viewpoint of attracting private capital to developing countries, and thus 
critical for the success of blended finance. This view regarding the importance of blended 
finance soft law is supported by the Convergence’s study on the characteristics of 
successful blended finance operations.14 Failures to accommodate the perspective of 
PE/VC investors would likely lead to not attracting private capital at an adequate scale. 
This is because private equity is primarily driven by profitability, and investments that do 
not consider this will likely fall short from attracting private equity. The notions contained 
in blended finance soft law are critical for PE/VC investors because they highlight the 
need to consider private investors’ objectives, among which are issues which have 
traditionally been among make-or-break factors for private equity investors.15 Because 
this soft law addresses some concerns of PE/VC investors not addressed by other legal 
instruments binding upon development financiers, I will examine whether this soft law 
 
14 Convergence 2018, p. 17. Whereas Convergence’s study did not concern the importance of blended 
finance soft law, it nevertheless concerned factors common to successful blended finance operations. As 
later shown in my study, Convergence’s study acknowledges that certain notions highlighted in blended 
finance soft law have been often common for successful blended finance operations. Among these notions 
is, for example, agreeing upon common performance indicators. 
15 As later shown in my study, blended finance soft law includes several notions which have traditionally 
been vital for private equity and venture capital investors. Among these are, for example, considerations 
related to e.g. scalability. The reason why these issues are critical for PE investors stems from the fact that 
private equity as a form of capital is heavily geared towards profitability, although it now accommodates 
environmental and society related issues, too. 
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needs to be disregarded in any situations. I will also consider lack of legitimacy, which 
might hinder the application of blended finance soft law.  
Traditionally, in developing countries risks have been out of line compared to possible 
profits, i.e. the risk-return ratio has been unattractive for private investors. This is what 
blended finance seeks to address. Thus, as my third research question, I will carefully 
examine blended finance instruments at disposal of private equity investors and establish 
how these risk management alternatives accommodate macro risks typically associated 
with investments in developing countries. Macro risks are risks that are not at a project 
level, and encompass risks such as political/institutional, regulatory and financial 
(macroeconomic) risks. My research considers those blended finance instruments that are 
available for private equity investors. Blended finance instruments nevertheless cannot 
fix all risks associated with investments in developing countries and one of the most 
prominent risks is regulatory risk i.e. a chance of a portfolio company’s host state 
adopting regulations that negatively affect the value of the investment. While answering 
my third research question, I will bring up gaps blended finance instruments leave in 
terms of addressing macro risks such as regulatory risks. I will also briefly bring up 
considerations related to climate policies from the viewpoint of PE/VC investors 
engaging in blended finance seeking to establish which kind of regulatory risks exist for 
PE/VC investors engaging in blended finance. 
Of different forms of finance, I have chosen to focus on private equity and venture capital, 
as the role of equity investment in blended finance has gone much of the time under radar 
in publications covering climate finance. Of different forms of private equity, venture 
capital is particularly intriguing due to its nature in financing technological innovations, 
which are undoubtedly needed in solving the climate crisis. Moreover, whereas there has 
been research conducted on blended finance and its feasibility in general, the ability of 
blended finance to mitigate or transfer risks has not yet caught academic attention, at least 
not from a PE/VC investors’ point of view. This might be due to the fact that new climate 
funds16 have recently gained more attention, thus putting the emphasis on mobilizing 
climate finance from institutional investors and not from private equity investors. I 
consider my research questions to be relevant for PE/VC investors because blended 
 
16 An example of a multilateral climate fund is the Green Climate Fund which seeks to mobilize climate 
finance from institutional investors such as pension funds which hoard massive amounts of wealth. 
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finance operations offer alternatives for risk governance which differ from those 
employed in operations where development financiers are not present.  
From a risk governance side, I wanted to reflect particularly macro risks such as 
political/institutional, financial (macroeconomic) and regulatory risks. Whereas engaging 
in blended finance operations might have other benefits for private equity investors in 
terms of addressing also risks tied to project level, I have excluded project risks from the 
scope of my study. I have chosen to focus particularly on macro risks because the 
relevance of macroeconomic conditions, a component of macro risks, has been 
considered a determinant factor in profitability in earlier research.17 I have chosen macro 
risks also because equity investments are considered risky already in developed countries, 
let alone in countries with weak institutional strengths and financial markets, coupled 
with concerns of political risks. These are risks commonly associated with investments 
in low-income countries, such as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Since my 
research is focused on macro risks generally associated with investing in developing 
countries, its findings are not limited to a specific group of countries such as low-income 
countries. Thus, the findings of my study may be relevant also for other developing 
countries, such as lower-middle-income economies.18 Whereas the risks detailed in my 
research have been commonly associated with developing countries, I am bringing up 
considerations relevant particularly for low-income countries where macroeconomic 
conditions are weaker than in other developing countries. 
I have chosen to focus on private equity investments particularly in the poorest developing 
countries, low-income countries such as the Least Developed Countries because: i) many 
bilateral and multilateral development financiers are focusing on these countries paving 
the way for private equity investors; because ii) low-income countries such as the LDCs 
have gained the least attention in private investor peers; and because iii) the LDCs have 
mobilized ten times less private finance than upper-middle income countries19. As many 
low-income countries are sub-Saharan African countries with the world’s fastest growing 
economies with high population growth rates and increasing energy needs, they offer 
 
17 Office of Evaluation and Oversight 2017, p. 18 notes that the International Finance Corporation has 
highlighted the importance of macroeconomic conditions stating that 60% of the institution’s returns could 
be attributed to macroeconomic conditions. 
18 World Bank 2019 divides countries into different classes based on their income. These groups are low-
income countries, lower-middle income countries, upper-middle income countries, and high-income 
countries. 
19 OECD – UNCDF 2019, p. 13. Average amount mobilized for the LDCs has been US$ 6.1 million per 
transaction compared to US$ 61 million per transaction in upper-middle income countries. 
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interesting growth opportunities for foreign investors if macro risks are tackled and risk-
return ratios rebalanced.  
1.3 Methods and the organization of the text 
My research utilizes different methods for each one of my research questions. Whereas 
this choice might appear unorthodox, such an approach best reflects varying natures of 
my research questions and also best answers them. My first research question on the 
alignment of terms ‘blended finance’ and ‘climate finance mobilization’ employs legal 
dogmatics as its primary method. My second research question takes into account 
practical challenges to the application of soft law. Thus, my first two research questions 
combine de jure and de facto approaches. In my third research question I use a method 
combining both economic and legal literature, using economic literature to understand 
different types of risks faced by private equity investors in developing countries. My third 
research question is explorative in nature and seeks to provide an overview of blended 
finance instruments available for private equity investors. My third research question also 
seeks to establish how these instruments accommodate macro risks commonly associated 
with investments in developing countries, examined from the perspective of low-income 
countries in particular.  
In the beginning of my research I explain blended finance as a concept in further detail. 
This choice reflects the notion that blended finance as a term is a novelty in private equity 
peers. After this, I proceed to provide the reader with the key features of development 
financiers and PE/VC investors in chapter two. After this, I will assess what is the climate 
law’s position regarding blended finance and which are the Paris Agreement’s most 
critical provisions in this regard. Because blended finance is not a term mentioned in the 
Paris Agreement, the soft law I consider is adopted outside the United Nations (UN) 
climate regime. In this regard, I have chosen soft law on blended finance from the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC). I then proceed to illustrate how ‘climate finance mobilization’ 
of the Paris Agreement and ‘blended finance’ relate to one and another. I will then 
continue to establish whether blended finance soft law can be expected to be applied by 
development financiers in the aligned substance matter area of climate finance 
mobilization and blended finance while considering challenges to the application of this 
soft law. 
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In chapter four, I proceed to examine risks typically associated with investing in 
developing countries examining these risks from the perspective of low-income countries. 
For the sake of systematic approach, I have grouped risks into macro and project (or 
commercial) risks, dividing the former into three sub-groups: regulatory, 
political/institutional, and financial (or macroeconomic) risks. I have categorized those 
risks which have been considered the most critical in the literature and reflected in the 
opinions of private equity investors. After examining how blended finance instruments 
address macro risks generally associated with investing in developing countries such as 
low-income countries, I summarize which types of risks persist, i.e. what are the risks 
against which blended finance instruments offer inadequate protection. With regard to the 
gaps in protection against macro risks, I pay particular attention to regulatory risks which 
pertain when PE/VC investors engage in blended finance and invest in projects that 
support combating climate change and its adverse effects. 
Because my research has a heavy emphasis on risk, not exploring economic literature is 
no option. Of this literature, I am using economic literature regarding macroeconomic 
conditions in developing countries, development financiers (development finance 
institutions and development banks), and private equity.  
Challenges for my research stem from the fact that the Paris Agreement is primarily a 
procedural treaty which entails no sanctions. Thus, assessment regarding the Agreement 
needs to take into account de facto effectiveness considerations. Another challenge for 
my research stems from risk classifications and aspirations to provide a complete picture 
of macro risks associated with equity investments in developing countries. For this 
reason, I have sought to rely on a number of sources regarding risks generally associated 
with investing in developing countries. I have also considered opinions of private equity 
investors to gain a better understanding of risks which are the most determinant risks 
when investing in developing countries such as low-income countries.  
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2. TERMS AND FRAMEWORKS 
2.1 Blended finance 
As private equity firms are seeking for new growth opportunities in developing countries 
and as development finance institutions and banks are trying to help developing countries 
to cope with climate change and limit its adverse effects, blended finance seems to 
provide for a win-win situation. Nevertheless, this must be confirmed through further 
examination. Currently, there is ambiguity and variety with regard to the definition of 
blended finance,20 but the term can be understood as the “strategic use of development 
finance for the mobilisation of additional finance towards sustainable development in 
developing countries”, additional finance referring to commercial finance that does not 
have an explicit development purpose.21 For the purpose of my research, I have chosen 
the OECD definition of blended finance because I will also address soft law from the 
OECD and because the definition encompasses the key elements present in other 
definitions of blended finance. Other definitions embody similar notions as the OECD’s 
definition but differ in approach and emphasis.22 Thus, it cannot be said that blended 
finance has one clear and definite definition albeit the content of different terms is in 
essence very similar. Nevertheless, the component of financing sustainable development 
is in the heart of blended finance, and the blended finance instruments available for 
private equity investors require these investors to adhere to sustainability standards. 
The reason why blended finance is relevant for my research is because achieving the key 
objectives of the Paris Agreement practically requires it, although the Agreement does 
not explicitly refer to it.  Blended finance as a term is a novelty and it has taken off the 
ground especially after Addis Ababa Financing for Development conference in 2015. 
Combining instruments and institutions in creative ways have been estimated to be among 
the most fruitful approaches.23 However, as Klein notes, blended finance transactions 
should not be attempted lightly and it must be carefully assessed, whether the 
fundamentals for financeable transactions are in place.24 I understand this to mean that 
whereas blended finance can be used to attract private finance into transactions, it cannot 
 
20 OECD 2018, p. 13. 
21 OECD 2018, p. 13. 
22 OECD 2018, p. 49–50 makes a list of different definitions of blended finance as developed by institutions, 
development actors and researchers. 
23 Thompson 2016, p. 155. 
24 Klein 2015, p. 1. Klein acknowledges that blended finance is not a panacea and it will not make financially 
unsustainable transactions sustainable nor render unaffordable infrastructures affordable.  
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solve fundamental problems in the financing structure. Blended finance investments 
where risks are out of line compared to possible returns, are not likely to succeed. Thus, 
considering the perspective of private equity investors is vital for successful blended 
finance operations. 
The role of blended finance is to attract additional finance, i.e. finance, that would not 
have been committed if the development finance component of blended finance was not 
present. By development finance I refer to finance provided by development financial 
institutions (DFIs) and multilateral development banks (MDBs). These institutions have 
a capability to attract commercial finance as they have experience in riskier transactions 
in developing countries and they could participate in the riskier phases of different 
projects e.g. by means of junior shares and cushions. By commercial finance I refer to 
different forms of private finance not primarily aiming for development objectives, such 
as venture capital. Blended finance is important for achieving the objectives of the Paris 
Agreement as public streams of finance alone are not enough to fill the remaining 
investment gap. As the Paris Agreement sets US$ 100 billion as a floor for climate finance 
mobilization objective and as required infrastructure investments are around US$ 7 
trillion a year, US$ 100 billion should be understood as the development finance 
component of blended finance. This US$ 100 billion should then mobilize further 
commercial finance to fill the investment gap.  
Blended finance can take different forms and structures. For example, public funding can 
cover first losses in forms of grants, and junior equity can attract private sector investors. 
Later in my research I will use the term blended finance instruments to describe 
instruments offered by development financiers that mitigate/transfer risks, i.e. make them 
less prominent in the first place or transfer them away from private investors. It must be 
noted that whereas in some cases blended finance means that development financiers and 
PE/VC investors invest in the same portfolio companies, the situation is not always this 
and blended finance instruments can also involve political risk insurances from 
development finance actors. Thus, blended finance does not in all cases mean that 
development financiers and PE/VC investors hold equity positions in portfolio 
companies. This is only one option, and it will be covered in further detail in chapter four. 
Whereas clearly identified development impact outcomes, objectives and outputs have 
been common for successful blended finance projects, it should be acknowledged that 
blended finance is better to employ only into such activities that provide cash flows 
12 
 
enabling financial returns for private sector investors.25 Also, the feasibility of blended 
finance highly depends on the type of finance that has been employed. Using equity 
funding does not seem like an attractive option in cases where projects involve little 
technological or operational risks, and when cheaper debt financing can be used. Thus, 
not all promising conclusions about the mobilization of private finance should be 
generalized to apply to mobilization of private equity. There are, for example, plenty of 
climate-resilient energy projects that have been financed by market-rate loans. It is the 
involvement of risk that should determine the appropriateness of private equity in blended 
finance investments.  
Private equity investors’ expertise in growing companies combined with DFIs’ and 
MDBs’ willingness to assume risks of initial costs seems to be a match made in heaven. 
Combining capital from these two very different types of investors, however, represents 
several questions. Although blended finance can attract commercial finance into 
otherwise too risky transactions, it cannot alter the fundamental economics of different 
industries.26 Rather, it makes changes to risk-return ratio attracting private investors to 
invest in developing countries. Among these investors are also private equity investors. 
2.2 Private equity investments 
2.2.1 Private equity 
Private equity (PE) refers to private capital that is not listed on a public exchange. Private 
equity can take different forms such as venture capital (VC), angel investments, distressed 
investments, growth capital and leveraged buyouts. In my research I am examining 
blended finance particularly from the viewpoint of VC investors with regard to 
mitigating/transferring macro risks associated with investments in developing countries. 
Nevertheless, my conclusions can be generalized to cover also other types of PE 
investments although macro risks are examined from the viewpoint of VC investors. The 
risk mitigation/transfer instruments specified in this study are not limited with regard to 
the types of private equity. Because in the heart of blended finance is attracting additional 
finance, it is questionable how relevant blended finance investments are at this stage for, 
say, leveraged buyouts. Private equity is not only used by PE firms and funds, but it also 
 
25 Convergence 2018, p. 17. 
26 Klein 2015, p. 1. 
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used by development financiers which also seek to influence the conduct of portfolio 
company through board management. 
Venture capital is often used to finance new innovations e.g. in the field of technology by 
new companies when cheaper finance such as debt is not available. Through VC financing 
venture capitalists often acquire a minority shareholder position in a portfolio company 
seeking to grow its value and then exit the portfolio company through initial public 
offering (IPO) or other means such as strategic sales.  
Venture capital firms are highly driven by growth and revenue.27 As I will later in my 
research illustrate, growth aspirations of PE/VC investors might well be in par with those 
of development financiers.28 Aligned objectives of PE/VC firms and development 
financiers matter because with very diverging objectives it would be hard to attract private 
capital to developing countries such as low-income countries. However, not all private 
equity/venture capital firms have similar objectives, and some are more focused on 
financial returns whereas some take into account a broader range of issues, such as 
environmental and social impact of the investments. In my research my emphasis is on 
PE/VC investors seeking to create an impact and deliver financial returns. For this reason, 
I will briefly explain impact investing and how it relates to PE/VC investing. 
2.2.2 Impact investing 
Impact investing refers to investments that seek to provide financial returns for investors 
and also create positive impacts on states where portfolio companies are operating. One 
way to frame impact investing is investing in multidimensional companies with a double 
or even triple purpose, financial and social.29 However, despite interested in making an 
impact, also impact investors are primarily driven by profit,30 and impact investments 
should not be mistaken as philanthropic in nature. The reason why impact investing has 
relevance for blended finance is because both PE/VC impact investors and development 
financiers target impact factors, although there is variance regarding desired impacts. 
However, investing that has positive impacts as outcomes does not per se qualify as 
 
27 See, for example, Block et al. 2019, p. 344. 
28 An example of this is job creation which is often a result of growth, and which thus contributes to the 
objectives of both private equity/venture capital investors and development finance institutions. 
29 Viviani – Maurel 2019, p. 38. 
30 GIIN 2017, p. 10 establishes that 48 per cent of investors surveyed primarily target risk-adjusted, 
market-rate returns whereas 31 per cent of investors surveyed targeted primarily below-market rate 
returns. 
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impact investing, as impact investing is about being explicit about managing to achieve 
the desired, previously articulated impact outcomes.31 Impact investing as a term has 
gained popularity during recent years but not all investors agree upon what impact 
investing is. Moreover, not all impact investors give exactly similar weight to financial 
returns and desired impacts, and this translates into different weight of incentives given 
regarding financial and impact outcomes.32 Whereas almost all investors are either 
interested or have already incorporated impact into their investment strategies, not all 
investors are willing to compromise financial returns at the expense of making an impact. 
This should be borne in mind also when understanding the feasibility of blended finance 
operations involving private capital. 
Whereas the point of this research is not to draw conclusions regarding profitability of 
blended finance investments, previously conducted research suggests that environmental, 
social and corporate governance issues do affect firm value.33 Since these concerns get 
heavy weight in blended finance operations, it can be carefully suggested that from this 
perspective, blended finance involving PE/VC could indeed be a feasible option for 
PE/VC investors. Furthermore, in the past countries open to foreign investment are now 
putting more weight e.g. on the impact of the investment on environmental and social 
issues.34 Assertations like this underline the importance of sustainability, which is what 
blended finance ultimately is all about. 
Impact investing as a term comes close to sustainable investing which also seeks to 
address environmental factors in addition to generating financial returns. There are no 
single, globally adopted sustainability standards but indeed there are many, among which 
the UN Principles on Responsible Investment (UNPRI) and Global Reporting Initiative.35 
Measurement methods private equity investors use include UNPRI, IRIS Metrics, and 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).36 The reasons investors want to measure their 
 
31 Clark – Emerson – Thornley 2014, p. 5. 
32 GIIN 2017 notes that financial performance and impact both are in the heart of impact investing. 
However, according to GIIN, traditionally impact investors have offered more commonly incentives related 
to financial performance leaving impact-related issues without external incentives. 
33 Fatemi et al. 2018, p. 58. A research by Fatemi et al. suggests that environmental strengths increase the 
firm valuation while environmental concerns decrease it. Weaknesses in social and governance issues 
decrease the firm valuation but strengths in these areas do not increase it. Based on this research, it is thus 
environmental factors that seem to have the biggest impact on firm valuation, and climate issues can 
certainly be counted among these factors. 
34 International Chamber of Commerce 2016, p. 5. 
35 For more standards, see e.g. Leblanc – Fraser 2016, p. 623. 
36 GIIN 2017, p. 15 concludes that IRIS Metrics are the most commonly used impact metric system, as 62 
per cent of GIIN survey respondents use IRIS Metrics and 42 per cent UN Sustainable Development Goals. 
15 
 
impact covers various reasons of which the want to measure the impact, reporting impact 
to key stakeholders (such as Limited Partners, LPs), managing and improving impact, and 
the possible business value of impact data were the most popular answers.37 Some of 
these issues are also covered in blended finance soft law, which will be discussed in 
chapter three. 
Impact investing relates to previously defined blended finance in that they both attempt 
to achieve similar objectives.38 As blended finance includes a public/development finance 
component, considerations regarding how well commercial PE/VC finance fits together 
with non-commercial development finance becomes an intriguing issue to examine. 
Among impact investors certain areas have attracted more attention than others: the most 
desired area for impact has been decent work and economic growth.39 This might not be 
surprising, and this feature is not common only to private investors and many DFIs and 
MDBs also include economic growth and job creation among factors they consider when 
estimating the impacts of their investments. Whereas development finance actors seek to 
maximize impact and create financial returns, the dominant criteria for a majority of 
PE/VC firms is maximizing financial returns and having an additional element of creating 
positive impacts. This raises interesting question from the viewpoint of PE/VC investors 
such as how combatable PE/VC financiers’ and development finance actors’ interests are, 
and what kind of benefits blended finance represents for PE/VC investors from the 
viewpoint of impact investing. 
2.3 Providers of development finance 
2.3.1 Development banks 
In my research I am focusing on institutions providing development finance, MDBs and 
DFIs, leaving out philanthropic actors, which have sometimes been mentioned as 
providers of blended finance.40 Of multilateral development banks, I am taking a closer 
look at the World Bank Group which also encompasses the International Finance 
Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Multilateral 
development banks have development mandates and previously, they have been active in 
 
However, it must be noted that the GIIN survey covered various types of investors such as institutional 
investors and not only private equity investors (GIIN 2017, p. 12). 
37 GIIN 2017, p. 14. 
38 World Economic Forum – OECD 2015, p. 8. 
39 GIIN 2017, p. 25. 
40 OECD 2018, p. 49–50 provides examples of different definitions of blended finance. Of these 
definitions, some make a reference to philanthropic finance. 
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riskier parts of transactions in developing countries. MDBs have been notably attractive 
actors in mobilizing private finance and some funds are seeing mobilization rates as high 
as 800 per cent.41  Reflecting the fragmentation of global climate governance, 
international organizations outside the United Nations climate regime such as the World 
Bank have sought to integrate climate change concerns in their operations.42 Engaging in 
blended finance in the form of providing principles on blended finance and providing 
blended finance instruments well reflects this notion. These principles and instruments 
will be examined in chapters three and four. 
Because blended finance seeks to rebalance risk-return ratio of investments in developing 
countries such as low-income countries, it is appropriate to inquire what multilateral 
development banks can do in this regard. Development banks can bring value for PE/VC 
investors engaging in blended finance investments, as they often have local expertise that 
is needed to advance in developing markets. These providers of development finance 
could e.g. finance specialized financial and technical advisory services.43 Development 
financiers such as MDBs can also undertake activities that lead to the improvement of 
markets in emerging and frontier markets, such as engage with governments on 
investment plans and procurement processes.44 Public finance lenders have the ability to 
provide stability also during times of high volatility and halts at capital markets such as 
financial crises.45 Multilateral development banks can further be beneficial in blended 
finance operations already due to their presence alone, as host countries can be deterred 
from acting against foreign investors’ interests fearing that such conduct can lead to 
repercussions from multilateral development financiers, such as the World Bank. 
2.3.2 Development finance institutions 
Besides MDBs, also development finance institutions can catalyse private finance to 
developing countries. DFIs are government-backed institutions investing in private sector 
projects in both low and middle-income countries, and often together with private sector 
investors.46 Sometimes development finance institutions prefer to invest in private equity 
 
41 Thompson 2016, p. 155 refers to the World Bank’s Clean Technology Fund as an example. For more 
information, see World Bank 2011, p. 14. For each US$ contributed to the Fund, US$ 8 in additional finance 
is attracted from both public and private sources. 
42 Van Asselt 2014, p. 23. 
43 World Economic Forum – OECD 2015, p. 11. 
44 World Economic Forum – OECD 2015, p. 11. 
45 International Monetary Fund 2011, p. 38. 
46 See, for example, Savoy – Carter – Lemma 2016, p. v. 
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directly and sometimes through specialized funds.47 DFIs invest in commercially 
sustainable projects and have a dual mandate of positively influencing development in 
developing countries besides delivering financial returns. It seems that DFIs can achieve 
both development impact and financial results. Indeed, empirical results have confirmed 
that a majority of investments made by European DFIs have earned both high 
development and high financial outcomes: only 4 per cent of considered projects have 
delivered high financial returns while ranking low in development.48 Lemma argues that 
the theoretical links between growth and DFIs are strong meaning that DFI investments 
into private sector help to reduce hurdles for growth, although the empirical studies in 
this field have been scarce.49  
As DFIs are government-controlled, they receive their instructions from their respective 
governments but in addition, DFIs have also joined different initiatives50 with the 
objective of mobilizing climate finance into developing countries. DFIs often follow 
policies set not only by their home governments but also those set by international 
agencies such as the World Bank Group. DFIs, as other investors, need to consider their 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) policies and other policies such as the IFC’s 
standards as appropriate. Standards which DFIs need to adhere to limit the scope of 
possible DFI investments. As DFIs may be required to heed high environmental and 
social standards, PE/VC investors who want to engage in the same companies in the form 
of blended finance can also be expected to follow high standards. Indeed, different 
blended finance instruments require private equity investors to comply with a high degree 
of sustainability requirements. These instruments will be addressed in chapter four. 
Development finance institutions can be bilateral or multilateral. The former seek to 
implement one country’s foreign development cooperation policies while the latter are 
institutions established by more than one country and act as the private sector parts of the 
International Finance Corporation.51 Such structures might also influence the policies 
followed by DFIs in their investments, including blended finance investments. In 
 
47 See, for example, Office of Evaluation 2017, p. 23 on returns delivered by fund investments in private 
equity. 
48 Dalberg 2010, p. 26–27 shows that depending on the measurement strategy, these numbers vary slightly 
but the overall results remain consistent: projects ranking high in development tend to rank high also in 
financial returns and high financial returns can be rarely achieved when the development impact is low. 
49 Lemma 2015, p. 18. 
50 An example of such initiative is a partnership formed between the Climate Finance Leadership Initiative 
and the Association of European Development Finance Institutions. 
51 EDFI. 
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development financing bilateral DFIs have become increasingly important players in 
terms of private capital mobilized.52 Majority of bilateral finance is now focused primarily 
on climate change mitigation projects, whereas some projects are cross-cutting and some 
focus only on climate change adaptation.53 The focus areas naturally depend on e.g. 
geographical location and country priorities. This is naturally an issue worth 
acknowledging also for PE/VC investors: from the profitability point of view it makes 
little sense to engage in blended finance investments that do not provide adequate growth 
opportunities. 
Multilateral development financial institutions often have a greater financing capacity 
than bilateral DFIs and they allow for cooperation opportunities between governments.54 
Examples of multilateral DFIs include, for instance, the International Finance 
Corporation. Multilateral development financial institutions can provide their resources 
to be used as risk management tools such as political risk insurances.55  
Development finance institutions can contribute to the catalysation aims of blended 
finance e.g. by taking riskier equity positions in portfolio companies. I will address these 
ways to leverage private capital to developing countries more in chapter four. DFIs have 
different reasons for equity investing, among which seeking to serve important but 
overlooked investees, helping to build local equity markets, maximizing impact while 
generating returns and influencing the private sector inside companies.56 European DFIs 
can help to improve standards in relation to, for instance, environmental compliance and 
good practices related not only to workers but also to the larger community.57 
Nevertheless, DFIs have not always maintained a clean track of record in the past.58 DFIs 
in their equity investments, similarly to PE firms, seek to influence decision-making 
through boards and they are not often majority shareholders59 in their companies. 
 
52 OECD – UNCDF 2019, p. 33 notes how bilateral DFIs have become more important players in mobilizing 
private finance into the Least Developed Countries. As per amounts, multilateral institutions were the 
biggest players. 
53 UNFCCC 2018, p. 8 notes that of US$ 31.7 billion of bilateral climate finance 50 per cent was committed 
to mitigation, 29 per cent to adaptation, and 21 per cent to cross-cutting projects focusing both on mitigation 
and adaptation. This data is from years 2015–2016. 
54 Dickinson. 
55 See, for example, Climate Policy Initiative 2015, p. 8. 
56 Office of Evaluation and Oversight 2017, p. 13–14. 
57 Dalberg 2010, p. 18. 
58 An example is the International Finance Corporation’s conduct in Honduras. See, Juana Doe et al. v. 
IFC. 
59 Similarly, private equity firms often hold minority shareholder positions in companies and seek to the 
influence the management of companies through boards. Venture capital firms predominantly take minority 
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Even though development finance aims to become irrelevant one day in the future, for a 
period of time, development finance and commercial private finance will co-exist.60 Co-
existing of commercial and development finance simply does not imply that they will co-
exist the exactly same period of time, although the exit times of private equity firms and 
development finance institutions might align. Similarities of development financiers and 
PE/VC investors and their co-existing are issues worth consideration for PE/VC investors 
as similar objectives and the presence of development financiers in blended finance 
operations can help to mitigate risks associated with investing in developing countries 
such as low-income countries. Because both development financiers and PE/VC investors 
seek to influence the performance of portfolio companies predominantly through board 
management, having very diverging would make it hard, if not possible, to manage the 
business. This remark is relevant in situations where both development financiers and 
PE/VC investors own equity in the same portfolio companies. Next, I will assess how 
development financiers measure the impact of their investments. 
2.3.3 Development financiers and impact measurement 
Traditionally, an important measure of development has been job creation61. DFIs have 
traditionally used job creation as a measure of assessing the development impact of their 
investments.62 Mostly this has concerned direct jobs created, as indirect63 employment 
creation measurement can be hard and inaccurate. However, not all jobs created imply 
development impact: this is the case e.g. in situations where the jobs created do not benefit 
the poor.64 An example of such situation is when high-technology innovations are brought 
to areas where the workforce lacks necessary education.  
However, poverty and poverty reduction goals are not measured by DFIs, as DFI 
investments as a rule do not directly affect the poor.65 Dalberg asserts that besides jobs, 
 
shareholder positions, but this is not a rule without exceptions for private equity. Large leveraged buyouts 
can, for example, involve PE firms taking majority shareholder positions. 
60 See, for example, OECD DAC Principles of Blended Finance, p. 9 on investments where development 
finance and commercial finance co-exist. 
61 Massa 2013, p. 2 notes that job creation has been one of the top priorities for development finance 
institutions such as the International Finance Corporation, African Development Bank and European 
Investment Bank. 
62 Massa 2013, p. 2. 
63 Indirect job creation refers to jobs created in supplier or distribution firms linked to development finance 
institutions’ portfolio companies. For more, see Lemma 2015, p. 17. 
64 Massa 2013, p. 5. 
65 Lemma 2015, p. 22–23. 
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DFIs measure their impact through also taxes and net currency effect.66 Development 
impact considerations for DFIs include also innovation and technology development.67 
These are certainly critical factors also for venture capital investors, and the fact that DFIs 
and PE/VC investors share investment-wise at least partly similar objectives implies that 
blended finance prima facie seems an alternative with the ability to mobilize capital from 
private equity investors. Nevertheless, it must be carefully examined whether 
development financiers can accommodate risk concerns of private equity investors in 
blended finance operations. This stems from the fact that PE/VC investors are primarily 
driven by profit, and without accommodating risks in developing countries, blended 
finance will likely fall short. 
Now that I have briefly introduced blended finance, development financiers and private 
equity/venture capital investors, it is time to look at the fundamentals of the United 
Nations climate change law regime, which is also relevant from the viewpoint of blended 
finance. It is relevant because a treaty of the regime, the Paris Agreement, contains one 
term that is examined in my research, namely climate finance mobilization. A brief 
examination of the regime is also relevant because climate finance mobilization is not an 
issue which can be considered without knowing the key objectives that lay underneath it.  
In the next section, I will briefly cover the most central features of the UN climate change 
treaties to understand which principles guide the interpretation of the provisions of the 
Paris Agreement – among these also the climate finance mobilization article. Later in my 
research I will examine this article to establish how climate finance mobilization relates 
to blended finance. This examination of climate law treaties and their most central 
features is warranted because climate change regime is a complex and continuously 
evolving system, and rules pertaining to climate change are multi-layered, involve 
different actors at different levels, and span on different policy areas. Although the 
climate law regime is known for its complexity, it has evolved around different principles 
which even today form the backbone of international climate change law. Examining 
‘climate finance mobilization’ without examining the most central features of the UN 
climate regime would fail to give a sufficiently detailed picture of the issue. 
 
 
66 Dalberg 2010, p. 29. According to Dalberg, net currency effect measures the contribution of the company 
to the national balance of payment. 
67 Massa 2013, p. 8. 
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2.4 The climate law framework 
2.4.1 The UNFCCC 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was the first 
international treaty on climate change and a rich and diverse regime has developed around 
it. The cornerstone of current climate regime, the UNFCCC was adopted in 1992 and due 
to its high ratification rate, it has become universal in scope.68 The UNFCCC was then 
followed, but not replaced by the Paris Agreement which I will assess next and which is 
more relevant for my research. Around the UNFCCC various forms of cooperation, legal 
instruments, funding instruments, and initiatives have been developed and neither 
adaptation nor mitigation finance has remained intact from international regulation. In 
many ways, the Paris Agreement builds on the rules laid down in the UNFCCC and 
climate finance is no exception to the rule. 
The main objective of the UNFCCC is to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system”. As the UNFCCC is a framework convention supplemented by other 
binding legal instruments,69 it does not itself specify in detail country obligations 
regarding greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions but these are for example detailed 
in the Kyoto Protocol, which is the second treaty adopted under the UN climate law 
regime. Because the Kyoto Protocol does not entail obligations regarding climate finance 
mobilization,70 and because it rather just adds flesh to the bones of the UNFCCC, I have 
left it outside this presentation. 
Another key feature of the Convention is the “common but differentiated responsibilities” 
which refers to rather bifurcated responsibilities between developed and developing 
countries. The UNFCCC classifies countries into different groups, and in this sense it 
differs from the Paris Agreement although the latter agreement keeps up the bifurcated 
 
68 Kulovesi 2013, p. 35. 
69 Among these is the Kyoto Protocol which sets binding emission reduction targets for countries which 
have ratified the Protocol. Despite the Kyoto Protocol has been described as “dead”, it is still in force for 
countries that have ratified its second replenishment round. 
70 The Kyoto Protocol mentions the importance of finance in its treaty text but does not focus on climate 
finance mobilization. Article 13(4)(g) of the Kyoto Protocol spells out the obligation to mobilize additional 
financial resources in accordance with Article 11(2) of the Protocol, which in turn makes a reference to the 
articles of the UNFCCC. The Protocol is left out of this presentation because it does not have any 
independent obligations related to climate finance mobilization and because the Protocol builds upon the 
UNFCCC while not detailing obligations relevant for my research. 
22 
 
obligations regarding also climate finance.71 Rajamani acknowledges that certain 
commitments regarding climate finance, despite being binding, are essentially old and 
continuing ones which did not create new substantive obligations.72 Climate finance 
brings us to the Paris Agreement, which is in the core of my first research question 
regarding the alignment of the terms climate finance mobilization and blended finance.  
2.4.2 The Paris Agreement 
The Paris Agreement is the third treaty73 adopted under the UN climate change regime 
and it builds on a complex body of rules, procedures and institutions established earlier.74 
It is a milestone in efforts to limit the scope of climate change and a watershed due to its 
climate finance provision, which seeks to leverage finance for the purposes of combating 
climate change and its adverse effects. The first and the main objective of the Paris 
Agreement is to keep the global rise of temperature “well under 2 degrees Celsius”, 
making also a reference to 1.5 degrees Celsius.75 However, this goal cannot not be 
achieved without drastic shifts in global financial flows. According to Bohne et al., there 
was a broad consensus that climate finance enables climate action, and that both climate 
change mitigation and adaption require significant shifts in financial flows as well as 
private investment.76 Thus, it is logical that the Paris Agreement also aims to make global 
financial flows consistent “with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate 
resilient development”.77  
Other goals noted in Article 2 of the Agreement include eradicating poverty and ensuring 
that food security is not threated by fostering climate resilient and low-emission 
development. The Paris Agreement preamble raises a broader set of concerns in its 
preamble than the previous climate treaties and particularly its focus on human rights is 
something unpreceded in international climate change agreements.78 Whereas preambular 
language has a more limited importance in practice than treaty obligations, these human 
 
71 The UNFCCC in its Articles 4(3)–4(7) spelled out ways how developed countries shall assist developing 
countries by means of finance. The Paris Agreement in its Article 9 leaves developed countries with the 
primary responsibility in providing climate finance while encouraging other parties to the Agreement to 
participate in providing climate finance. 
72 Rajamani 2016, p. 353. 
73 Bodle – Overthür 2017, p. 92. Bodle and Overthür consider the Paris Agreement to be clearly a treaty 
due to fulfilling several criteria, among which the entry into force of the Agreement and several formal 
procedures common for treaties. 
74 Depledge 2017, p. 27. 
75 Article 2(1) of the Paris Agreement. 
76 Bodle et al. 2016, p. 11. 
77 Article 2(1) of the Paris Agreement. 
78 Nishimura 2018, p. 48. 
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rights concerns reflect notions that are worth acknowledging also when mobilizing 
private finance into developing countries for the purposes of combating climate change 
and its adverse effects. 
The Paris Agreement on climate change is legally binding upon states who have ratified 
it but not all provisions of the Agreement have normative content. As such, the level of 
binding degree of the Agreement’s obligations varies between provisions. The Paris 
Agreement combines both harder and softer provisions.79 It must be recalled that binding 
international treaties, such as the Paris Agreement, do not necessarily fall into ‘hard law’ 
or ‘soft law’ category, but can embody features of both classes.80 The Paris Agreement 
has a number of provisions which, according to Rajamani, seem to have weak normative 
content, if any.81 Provisions of the Paris Agreement that do impose clear obligations for 
the parties to the Agreement are procedural and process-related, which require further, 
political decisions by the parties.82 In this sense, the Paris Agreement is similar to the 
UNFCCC. In spite of the procedural nature of the Agreement, it should not be concluded 
that the ‘hard law’ obligations of the Paris Agreement are related only to reporting and 
other procedural obligations. One of provisions tied to the ‘hard law’ obligation, the 
purpose of the Agreement, is climate finance mobilization article 9(3), which seeks to 
attract capital for climate-friendly investments. 
Because of this mixture of norms varying in terms of normative nature, it is vital to 
understand that the Paris Agreement is addressed to states and not to private investors or 
development financiers. Treaties binding upon states only are binding upon states and not 
directly binding upon the organs of that state.83 This is the case also for bilateral DFIs, 
many of which are entirely state-owned or at least have states as major shareholders. 
International environmental law does not directly apply to private enterprises,84 such as 
private equity investors. For this reason, treaty ratification is an issue that must be noted.  
The Paris Agreement, similarly to the UNFCCC, has been widely ratified. The European 
Union (EU) ratified the Paris Agreement in October 2016, followed by Finland’s 
ratification in November 2016 when the Agreement also entered into force. This implies 
 
79 Pickering et al. 2019, p. 21. 
80 See, for example, Pickering et al. 2019 who refer to the Paris Agreement’s innovative approach as a 
‘Crème Brûlée’ due to featuring both hard law and soft law obligations. 
81 Rajamani 2016, p. 337. 
82 Bergkamp – Stone 2015, p. 15. 
83 Nollkaemper 2014, p. 130. 
84 Majean-Dupois – Richard 2013, p. 93. 
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that for the EU countries, the Paris Agreement will be implemented both at the EU and 
national levels, the EU-level implementations influencing operations of development 
financiers such as the European Investment Bank and national-level implementation 
affecting bilateral development financiers’ operations. Despite the Agreement covers 
years from 2020 onwards, solutions for GHG emission reductions have been sought 
already before year 2020.85  Because the Paris Agreement needs to be implemented in 
some countries due to not being self-executing, implementation measures vary. For this 
reason, I will examine the provisions of the Paris Agreement and not its implementation 
measures. 
Since the Paris Agreement does not replace the UNFCCC but rather complements it, it is 
useful to look at what new the Agreement brings to the regime. The Paris Agreement has 
taken important steps in recognizing the role of non-state actors, making it a novelty also 
in this regard. As Hale notes, both non-state and sub-state actions now belong to the core 
features of international governance and they have also reached a large scale.86 Among 
these actors are for instance development financiers and private investors. The Paris 
Agreement is similar to the UNFCCC in terms of substance matter and keeps up rather 
bifurcated obligations for developed and developing countries implying, inter alia, a 
more prominent role for developed countries in mitigating climate change and leveraging 
finance for the purposes of combating climate change and its adverse effects. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that also developing countries have to submit their 
emission reduction plans. As a practical consequence, foreign investors engaging in 
blended finance in developing countries should consider these plans as they might give 
regulatory signals regarding legislation a country is about to adopt in the future to tackle 
its GHG emissions. The Paris Agreement also differs from the UNFCCC’s Kyoto 
Protocol in that it follows a ‘bottom-up’ approach leaving a vital role for national 
mitigation plans. For this reason, examining these national plans becomes worth 
understanding. 
2.4.3 National plans under the climate regime 
Both under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement national mitigation plans were 
adopted.87 Under the Paris Agreement national mitigation plans are called Nationally 
 
85 Finnish Ministry of the Environment 2018. 
86 Hale 2018, p. 3. 
87 Non-binding national plans adopted within the spheres of the United Nations climate change regime 
include NAMAs, NAPAs, NAPs, INDCs and NDCs, of which NAMAs and (I)NDCs focus on climate 
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Determined Contributions (NDCs). Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDCs) were provided by countries before the Paris Conference where the Agreement 
was adopted. It is year 2020 when parties to the Paris Agreement have to submit new, 
updated and more ambitious NDCs. The Parties to the Agreement are under an obligation 
to prepare their NDCs and update them every five years to make them more updated and 
ambitious. This obligation is one of the hardest, and most binding provisions of the Paris 
Agreement. 
NDCs themselves are not binding but often detail mitigation and adaptation efforts better 
than the Paris Agreement itself. (I)NDCs show countries’ priorities, circumstances and 
capabilities. They give non-state actors next five years’ policy directions which may result 
in changes also in regulation. For this reason, national mitigation plans have also 
relevance for macro risks, in particular for regulatory risks. Formally speaking NDCs are 
not a part of the Paris Agreement although they make references to it.88 The Paris 
Agreement does not oblige parties to the Agreement fulfil their NDCs as they are only 
required to pursue measures “with the aim of achieving the objectives of such 
contributions”.89 The Paris Agreement cannot be criticized for lack of ambition, but the 
provisions dealing with GHG emission reductions do not oblige country parties to the 
Agreement heed them.90 Bergkamp – Stone argue that NDCs “may be binding”, as parties 
to the Agreement rely on other parties’ pledges.91 I consider NDCs to be relevant for the 
mere reason that in the future they might include also finance-related commitments.92 
As the Paris Agreement was unprecedent in that sense it required all parties to the 
Agreement, including low-income countries such as the Least Developed Countries, to 
make commitments in terms of climate change mitigation, understanding the significance 
of national plans becomes vital. This is because these plans can shed light on the future 
regulatory and executive priorities in developing countries. As the Paris Agreement in its 
 
change mitigation. NAMA is an abbreviation of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action, NAPA of 
National Adaptation Programmes of Action, NAP of National Adaptation Plan, and (I)NDC from 
(Intended) Nationally Determined Contributions. The (I)NDCs are commitments made under the Paris 
Agreement whereas the other national plans are made under the UNFCCC. 
88 Bodle – Overthürn 2017, p. 93. 
89 Bodle et al. 2016, p. 7. 
90 Ogbumgbada 2016 for critical notions of the Paris Agreement. 
91 Bergkamp – Stone 2015, p. 15. Bergkamp – Stone also argue that in cases of non-compliance with NDCs, 
countries might invoke an exception or defence. About the uncertainty regarding whether NDCs are legally 
binding or not, see also Scott 2018, p. 619–620. 
92 This possibility has been brought up by e.g. Whitley et al. 2018, p. 32. Whitley et al. have referred to the 
country-driven nature of NDCs when assessing the possibility of governments to include finance-related 
commitments to NDCs. 
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preamble refers to taking full account of national development priorities,93 national plans 
give more detail in this regard detailing which kind of investments support and which are 
not in par with this objective. Moreover, national plans highlighting country’s 
development priorities might be useful in that sense they enable PE/VC investors to 
access specific risk mitigating insurance schemes, an issue which I will examine in 
chapter four. National plans made under the UNFCCC and more recently under the Paris 
Agreement are nevertheless not the only non-binding legal instruments that are relevant 
for my research. I will explain the nature of these instruments next. 
2.4.4 Soft law 
Soft law refers to different legal instruments that are not legally binding but may 
nevertheless be influential in terms of guiding behaviour of various actors such as 
development financiers engaging in blended finance. Soft law is particularly important 
for blended finance because instruments regulating blended finance operations are yet to 
take more binding forms. Thus, relevant legal instruments on blended finance are, well, 
soft. They have emerged outside the previously presented UN climate law regime, which 
is not exceptional in the context of the complex and multi-layered climate change law 
regime. Soft law instruments are diverse, and they cover, inter alia, declarations of 
principles and action plans adopted at international conferences, international 
recommendations adopted by international institutions, operational procedures, and 
safeguard policies.94 Various legal instruments put forward by the OECD and the World 
Bank Group fall into this category.95 For my research, the most relevant soft law 
instruments are blended finance principles, which have been adopted by both the OECD 
and the IFC, which is an organ of the World Bank Group. Later in my research I refer to 
these principles as ‘blended finance soft law’. 
But is soft law worth considering, really? Powerful organizations behind these soft 
instruments, such as the OECD, do not always choose to use their ‘hard law’ powers in 
influencing states’ and non-state actors’ conduct. Soft law should not be considered weak 
or worthless just because it is soft. As Blutman notes, soft law instruments should not be 
considered to be of inferior or lesser value when it comes to influencing or controlling 
the conduct of those operating at international level.96 Whereas companies might not 
 
93 The Paris Agreement preamble. 
94 Friedrich 2013 provides a complete analysis on different soft law instruments. 
95 Friedrich 2013, p. 40–45 and 52–55. 
96 Blutman 2010, p. 608. 
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always adhere to soft law recommendations in their own conduct, in blended finance it 
should be recognized that development finance actors often carefully follow non-binding 
regulations put forward by international organizations such as the OECD. This adherence 
of development financiers to blended finance soft law can also be important from a 
PE/VC investor point of view because the recommendations of the OECD and the IFC 
certainly bring up concerns that can be critical for these investors. Such issues include 
e.g. desired impact, performance measurement, growth, and commercial viability in 
general. Whereas private equity investors can consider these issues independently in their 
own investments, the situation is different when both development financiers and PE/VC 
investors invest in the same portfolio companies. 
2.5 Chapter conclusions 
In this chapter I have introduced general terms surrounding blended finance, and private 
equity/venture capital and development finance as its components. Whereas developing 
countries and particularly low-income countries have failed to attract private finance in 
adequate amounts in the past, blended finance seeks to transform the situation by 
rebalancing risk-return ratios of foreign investments in these countries. I noted that the 
objectives of PE/VC investors and development financiers align at least partly due to the 
fact that both PE/VC investors and development financiers strive towards job creation 
and technological innovation. Due to the aligned objectives, the ability of development 
financiers to add value in blended finance operations, and the high growth rates of low-
income countries, blended finance prima facie seems a feasible alternative also for PE/VC 
investors. 
In this chapter I have also briefly introduced the climate law regime built around the 
UNFCCC focusing on the newest international agreement on climate change: the Paris 
Agreement. The key issue of the Paris Agreement is that it entails provisions falling to 
different spots in the soft law–hard law spectrum, while emphasizing the role of 
Nationally Determined Contributions in achieving the key objectives of the Agreement. 
While the Paris Agreement includes clear obligations only on procedural matters and 
whereas the status of NDCs remains contested, this should not be considered as rendering 
the Agreement meaningless and as something private equity investors should pass. 
Reasons for this include the fact that national plans shed light on national priorities, an 
issue whose acknowledgement might be required also by some blended finance 
instruments.  
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In the next chapter I will lay down the basis for examining ways how blended finance 
instruments can mitigate/transfer different macro risks associated with investing in 
developing countries and low-income countries in particular. The next chapter focuses on 
the climate finance mobilization article of the Paris Agreement and examines how the 
term ‘climate finance mobilization’ relates to the term ‘blended finance’, which has been 
adopted outside the UN climate regime. If these terms regulate the same substance matter, 
this could have implications for the application of blended finance soft law in climate-
friendly investments.  
However, separately it should be established whether the soft law instruments regulating 
blended finance are actually applied by development financiers in the aligned substance 
matter area. This depends upon the legitimacy of these instruments as well as practical 
situations where these instruments should be disregarded. Blended finance soft law, i.e. 
the principles on blended finance, is vital for private equity investors because it addresses 
concerns these investors need to consider in all their investments, such as scalability and 
commercial viability in general. Without addressing these concerns blended finance 
would likely fall short from its objectives. This is particularly the case when development 
financiers and PE/VC investors own equity in the same companies. 
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3. CLIMATE FINANCE MOBILIZATION AND BLENDING 
3.1 Paris Agreement provisions on climate finance mobilization 
3.1.1 What is climate finance mobilization? 
The Paris Agreement seeks to leverage private finance for specific purposes just as 
blended finance does, i.e. by trying to attract different types of private finance (debt, 
mezzanine, equity) to these ends. Despite the Paris Agreement leaves the content of the 
terms climate finance and its mobilization unclear, Article 9(3) of the Agreement 
nevertheless refers to climate finance mobilization from a wide variety of instruments, 
sources and channels. This is the only hint regarding the content of these two terms that 
the Paris Agreement gives in its treaty text. Also, the travaux préparatoirés of the Paris 
Agreement do not further define ‘climate finance’ or its ‘mobilization’.97  
Regarding climate finance, a distinction can be made between climate-specific finance 
and climate-relevant finance, the former referring to capital flows targeting low-emission 
and climate-resilient development with (in)direct GHG mitigation or adaption outcomes 
or objectives. The latter term refers to all other flows which do not directly target 
mitigation or adaption but still might have relevance for GHG emissions or vulnerability 
to climate change.98 Despite the Paris Agreement does not use these terms in its treaty 
text, for the purpose of my research, climate-specific finance is on the focus. This choice 
stems from the fact that previously presented impact investing is focused on explicitly 
achieving environmental/social impact objectives and because also blended finance seeks 
explicitly to attract private finance for the purpose of sustainable development. According 
to Romano et al., the role of climate finance is to support sustainable economic growth.99 
Climate finance mobilization as a term can be understood as leveraging new sources of 
finance into low-emission and climate-resilient projects. Mobilization means crowding in 
finance that otherwise would not have been committed, so to say without the involvement 
of public providers of finance. Despite the term is seemingly straightforward, it does not 
only refer to attracted private finance which is co-invested with public finance. In climate 
finance mobilization the key element is additionality: private finance that would not have 
 
97 Not providing the content for the terms ‘climate finance’ and its ‘mobilization’ should not be considered 
problematic because the Paris Agreement is built upon the UNFCCC. When negotiating the Paris 
Agreement, there was a consensus that the older finance obligations would apply. For more, see for example 
Bodle et al. 2016, p. 11. See also Halonen et al. 2017, p. 11. 
98 Van Calster – Vandenberghe – Reins 2015, p. 510. 
99 Romano et al. 2018, p. 31. 
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been invested without the involvement of public or development finance. Lütken defines 
‘leveraging’ as meaning the mechanics that ensure that small actions in the public 
financing sector lead to greater and significant moves in the private sector.100 
Mobilization of climate finance should be understood as attracting further, commercial 
finance for low-emission and climate-resilient investments. This means making such 
financial arrangements by e.g. development finance providers (DFIs and MDBs) that 
encourage private investments for low-emissions and climate-resilient projects. In its 
core, mobilization of climate finance seeks to attract such private finance that otherwise 
would not have been committed. Climate finance mobilization should accommodate 
those concerns of private investors that in the past have deterred them from investing in 
developing countries. Mobilization as a term comes close to blended finance because the 
institutions mobilizing private finance such as MDBs and DFIs use financial instruments 
such as guarantees to attract private finance (equity, mezzanine and debt).  
Despite climate finance and its mobilization have not been defined in the Paris Agreement 
or its preparatory works, the sources from which climate finance should be mobilized 
have gained some attention within the UN climate change law regime. A report by the 
High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF) specified ‘a wide 
variety of sources’ to cover sources that are “public and private, bilateral and 
multilateral, including alternative sources of finance, the scaling up of existing sources 
and increased private flows”.101 Although the AGF worked on climate finance 
mobilization by year 2020,102 its notion on the sources of finance serves the purposes of 
understanding mobilization channels since the Paris Agreement leaves possible sources 
undefined. Based on this notion, climate finance should be understood as referring to 
local, national and transnational finance drawn from public, private and alternative 
sources. 
This broad notion of mobilization sources is further supported by the history of the Paris 
Agreement. When the Paris Agreement was under its way, there was a consensus that the 
financial obligations of UNFCCC Annex II countries, i.e. developed countries, would 
continue to apply.103 A real life consequence of this essentially refers to the amounts 
 
100 Lütken 2014, p. 40. 
101 Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing 2010. In 
addition, the Copenhagen Accord 2009, p. 7 provided a similar content for a ‘wide variety of sources’. 
102 The High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing 2010, para. 5. 
103 Bodle et al. 2016, p. 11. 
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expected to be mobilized and the sources from which finance should be mobilized. The 
Paris Agreement does not include specific quantitative finance objectives or even refer to 
the goal of 100 billion which was made earlier in Copenhagen.104 The UNFCCC parties 
agreed that this sum could come from public and private, bilateral and multilateral 
sources.105 By this broad reference the Agreement does not exclude any source of finance 
that can be used to mobilize further finance into low-emission and climate-resilient 
activities. Considering this notion of diverse mobilization sources in connection of the 
purpose of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, climate finance should be understood 
as finance that is aimed at climate change mitigation or adaptation purposes. In the Paris 
Agreement these purposes carry names ‘low-emission’ and ‘climate-resilient’ 
development, respectively.106  
3.1.2 Key provisions affecting climate finance mobilization 
No man is an island, and the same can be said of the provisions of the Paris Agreement – 
articles such as the climate finance mobilization article of the Agreement, Article 9(3), 
cannot be considered in isolation of the key articles of the Paris Agreement. As I noted in 
the beginning of my research, the Paris Agreement is built around the main, overarching 
objective of keeping the rise of the global temperature well under 2 degrees Celsius, 
referring also to the limit of 1.5 degrees Celsius.107 The Agreement also sets a 
corresponding GHG emission reduction goal.108 As the objective article of the 
Agreement, Article 2(1) of the Paris Agreement guides the interpretation and 
implementation of the other articles of the Agreement. 
Besides this key objective regarding the rise of global temperature, another provision in 
the core of and also one mentioned in Article 2(1) of the Paris Agreement is “making 
finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate-resilient development”.109 As the Standing Committee on Finance notes, this does 
not mean that all climate finance flows must have “explicitly beneficial climate 
outcomes”, but rather that they “must reduce the likelihood of negative climate 
outcomes”.110 Bodle – Overthür have brought up also a third provision mentioned in 
 
104 Bodle et al. 2016, p. 11. 
105 Condon 2013,p. 202. 
106 Article 2(1) of the Paris Agreement. 
107 Article 2(1)(a) of the Paris Agreement. See also Bodle – Overthür 2017, p. 95. 
108 Höhne et al. 2016, p. 17 making a reference to Article 4(1) of the Paris Agreement. 
109 The Paris Agreement Article 2(1)(c). 
110 UNFCCC 2018, p. 9. 
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Article 2(1): increasing the ability to adapt.111 These three key provisions guide the 
implementation and interpretation of the Paris Agreement. 
The Paris Agreement preamble offers further guidance for the interpretation of these key 
provisions of the Agreement. The Paris Agreement undisputedly qualifies as a treaty 
under international law,112 thus being subject to the rules of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Pursuant to Article 31(1) of the VCLT, a treaty “shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. Article 31(2) and 
32 of the VCLT highlight that also preambles and annexes to the treaties among other 
relevant documents shall guide the treaty interpretation.113 The Paris Agreement is no 
exception to this rule, and the overarching objectives regarding limiting the rise of global 
temperature, making finance flows consistent with climate-resilient development and 
adaptation perspective shall guide the interpretation and implementation of the 
Agreement. 
3.1.3 Role of public funds 
The Paris Agreement builds on the UNFCCC’s key objectives and rules, reflecting the 
UNFCCC’s well-known “common but differentiated responsibilities”, and the bifurcated 
responsibilities between developed and developing countries. Climate finance 
mobilization provision embodies this approach, and the Paris Agreement’s developed 
country parties “should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a 
wide variety of sources, instruments, and channels, noting the significant role of public 
funds, through a variety of actions, including supporting country-driven strategies, and 
taking into account the needs and priorities of developing country Parties. Such 
mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous 
efforts”.114 In this sense the Paris Agreement’s climate finance mobilization article is 
similar to blended finance, which also seeks to leverage finance to developing countries. 
This provision of the Paris Agreement places a duty of mobilizing climate finance for 
developed countries who should consider developing countries’ needs, priorities, and 
 
111 Bodle – Ovethür 2017, p. 95. 
112 Bodle – Overthür 2017, p. 92. 
113 Articles 31(2) and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
114 There is a broad consensus that the current level of action is not nearly enough to keep the rise of global 
temperature under 2 degrees Celsius. See, for example Höhne et al. 2016. As this notion is a few years old, 
it must be noted that the level of inaction from the viewpoint of achieving the Paris Agreement’s key 
objectives still remains. To this end, see, for example, UNEP 2019, p. XIII. 
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country-driven strategies when fulfilling this duty. This article, Article 9(3) of the 
Agreement, essentially implies that the finance for climate finance mobilization should 
come from wealthier nations. This finance can be used, for example, to finance bilateral 
or multilateral DFIs or it can contribute towards financing of MDBs. 
Article 9(3) emphasises the role of public finance in climate finance mobilization as it 
notes “the significant role of public funds” in mobilizing climate finance. This article of 
the Paris Agreement is interesting due to its emphasis on public finance. However, 
because my study focuses on the role of development financiers such as DFIs and MDBs 
in mobilizing climate finance, it must be asked whether development finance counts as 
‘public’ within the meaning of the Paris Agreement. As previously acknowledged, 
definitions of blended finance vary, and some do not mention the sources from which 
finance should be mobilized, whereas some definitions refer to public or development 
finance, some mentioning also philanthropic finance as finance used for mobilizing 
further, commercial finance.115 In the heart of blended finance concept is the “strategic 
use of development finance for the mobilisation of additional finance towards sustainable 
development in developing countries”, additional finance referring to commercial finance 
that does not have an explicit development purpose.116 Therefore, the Paris Agreement’s 
‘climate finance mobilization’ term and ‘blended finance’ embody similar ideas when 
examined from the perspective of mobilizing entity and entities from whom climate 
finance should be mobilized, i.e. the private sector.  
But is development finance public? In their research paper, Whitley et al. use a “narrow 
definition of public finance” when focusing on “majority government-owned financial 
institutions and funds”,117 thus suggesting that at least development finance from bilateral 
sources is public finance. Although the treaty text of the Paris Agreement speaks in terms 
of public and not development finance, many DFIs have states as their majority 
shareholders with private shareholders in minority shareholder positions.118 Despite some 
authors have defined DFIs to be situated between public aid and private investment 
spheres,119 finance provided by DFIs which are entirely or primarily state-owned, having 
 
115 OECD 2018, p. 49–50 makes a list of different definitions of blended finance as developed by 
institutions, development actors and researchers. 
116 OECD  2018, p. 13. 
117 Whitley et al. 2018, p. 19. 
118 For example, Finnfund has the Finnish state as its majority shareholder with 94.4 per cent together with 
Finland’s export credit agency Finnvera (5.5 per cent) and the Confederation of Finnish Industries (0.1 per 
cent). Data from 7 November 2019. 
119 Dickinson, p. 1. 
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other state agencies as minority shareholders, should not be regarded as not falling to the 
public finance category. This suggestion is consistent with the finding of Whitley et al., 
and more importantly this view is supported by the broad wording of Article 9(3) of the 
Paris Agreement. This is because this article refers to a wide variety of sources, 
instruments, and channels and just emphasizes the significant role of public funds, not 
implying that funding used for climate finance mobilization should be entirely public. If 
an opposite would have been meant, it seems reasonable to expect that a different phrasing 
would have been used in the Paris Agreement. 
The case of finance provided for multilateral DFIs and development banks is more 
complicated. Naturally, public funding is provided to these institutions, a part of which is 
official development aid.120 Because Article 9(3) indeed only notes the significant role of 
public funds, not requiring it should be the only source of finance used for mobilization, 
it seems feasible to argue that also multilateral DFIs and development banks are among 
entities which have a significant role in climate finance mobilization. It cannot be 
concluded that public finance means the same as development finance and development 
finance should rather be considered to be a component of public finance.  
Several reasons, among which the broad wording of Article 9(3) of the Paris Agreement, 
thus support the argument that development finance should be considered as public 
finance when it is provided by states through DFIs or used to finance MDBs. Based on 
these remarks it seems feasible to suggest that finance provided for development 
financiers is at least primarily public finance within the meaning of the Paris Agreement. 
Because of this also development finance, similarly to other public finance, has a notable 
role in mobilizing climate finance pursuant to the Paris Agreement. The definition of 
blended finance of the OECD refers to ‘development finance’,121 whereas other 
definitions make references also to public and philanthropic finance implying that the 
mobilizing entities are more diverse and encompassing in the case of blended finance 
than in the case of climate finance mobilization term employed in the Paris Agreement. 
Common to the different definitions of blended finance seems to be the role of 
concessional, i.e. non-commercial finance in the mobilization of private finance. Thus, 
the Paris Agreement and definitions of blended finance essentially both note the 
importance of development finance. Moreover, both the Paris Agreement and the OECD 
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definition of blended finance also use the term ‘mobilization’ of additional finance. They 
both also seek to leverage private finance to developing countries, the Paris Agreement 
additionally mentioning that such finance should be primarily mobilized by developed 
countries. Thus, the remaining issue relates to the purpose for which private finance 
should be mobilized. I will address this issue next. 
3.1.4 Purpose of mobilization 
The content of the climate finance mobilization term used by the Paris Agreement seems 
to match rather well with the essence of a number of definitions of blended finance, 
leaving only the alignment of the purposes of private finance mobilization open. Various, 
if not all, definitions of blended finance embody the notion of mobilization that additional 
finance should be mobilized for the purpose of sustainable development. The Paris 
Agreement, on the other hand, does not explicitly state the purpose of mobilization in its 
climate finance mobilization article, Article 9(3). This provision only makes a vague 
reference to the needs and priorities of developing country parties to the Paris Agreement. 
However, as previously noted, the purpose article of the Paris Agreement, Article 2, is 
vital also when considering other articles of the Agreement, including the climate finance 
mobilization article. The ultimate purpose of the Paris Agreement, limiting the rise of 
global temperature well under 2 degrees Celsius, is linked to the climate finance 
mobilization article through Article 3 of the Paris Agreement. Article 3 requires parties 
to the Paris Agreement to undertake “ambitious efforts” as defined in certain other articles 
of the Agreement, such as Article 9 containing the climate finance mobilization 
requirement. Thus, it is clear that finance should be mobilized for purposes which support 
the fulfilment of the Paris Agreement’s purpose. This refers to such purposes which: i) 
help to keep the rise of global temperature well under 2 degrees Celsius; and ii) help to 
adapt to adverse impacts of climate change.122 Later in my research I refer to these 
purposes as ‘low emission and climate-resilient development’. 
Besides the overarching objectives of the Paris Agreement and Article 9(3) on climate 
finance mobilization, the Paris Agreement has also other provisions relevant from the 
viewpoint of climate finance mobilization. The Agreement’s preamble emphasizing the 
 
122 The Paris Agreement has been concluded to have three overarching purposes: i) limiting the rise of 
global temperature well under 2 degrees Celsius; ii) adapting to the adverse impacts of climate change; and 
iii) making global finance flows consistent with the objective of low-emission and climate resilient 
development. As this third objective seeks to make financial flows with the consistent with the two first 
objectives, I did not include it as its own element of the purpose of the Paris Agreement in my research. 
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needs of developing countries, protection of human rights and decent working conditions, 
combating hunger, protecting biodiversity and action based on best available science shall 
guide in the interpretation of the Agreement. However, the preamble does not itself create 
obligations or rights for the parties to the Paris Agreement.123 Rather, its meaning is to 
shed light on concerns parties to the Agreement considered valuable. The fact that these 
issues have been mentioned in the preamble means that they alone cannot get the status 
of a treaty text but shall rather guide in the interpretation of the Agreement unless these 
objectives are specially mentioned also in the treaty text.  
As blended finance aspires to strategically attract private finance for the purpose of 
sustainable development, it seems that the only difference between climate finance 
mobilization and blended finance is the purpose for which private finance is leveraged. 
Whereas blended finance seeks to attract finance for sustainable development generally, 
the Paris Agreement seeks to attract finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation 
activities, i.e. low-emission and climate-resilient development. Thus, a question about the 
relation of the Paris Agreement and sustainable development arises. Next, it will be 
established how the purposes for which climate finance should be mobilized under the 
Paris Agreement, i.e. low-emission and climate-resilient development, are related to 
sustainable development. 
3.1.5 The Paris Agreement and sustainable development 
In the 1987 Brundtland Report, sustainable development has been defined as 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs”.124 Sustainable development has then 
continued be on the agenda of states although the exact definition of the term has caused 
discussion.125 Whereas definitions of sustainable development vary, this should not be 
made more problematic than it really is. Because the Paris Agreement does not make any 
explicit references to the definition of sustainable development, the exact content of the 
definition is not critical. 
It is certain that the Paris Agreement is intrinsically linked to sustainable development 
and the Sustainable Development Goals. The Paris Agreement supports sustainable 
 
123 Rajamani 2016, p. 343. 
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development and the preamble and various provisions126 of the Paris Agreement make 
explicit references to sustainable development. Among these provisions is also the 
overarching Article 2(1) spelling out the purpose of the Agreement.127 Many of the 
concerns raised in the preamble of the Paris Agreement are also mentioned in the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development which introduced the SDGs.128 I conclude, that 
many of the objectives mentioned in the preamble of the Paris Agreement reflect the 
SDGs.129 Therefore, it seems feasible to suggest that the Paris Agreement – due to 
sustainable development references of the preamble, the objective article, and several 
other articles – indeed supports sustainable development. 
However, separately it must be established how the purposes for which climate finance 
should be mobilized, low-emission and climate-resilient development, is linked to 
sustainable development. Because the purpose article of the Paris Agreement makes an 
explicit reference to sustainable development,130 there seems to be an evident link 
between sustainable development and climate finance mobilization article. This is further 
supported by the fact that the preamble of the Paris Agreement makes several references 
to sustainable development. As a result, ‘climate finance mobilization’ seems to be a part 
of blended finance, the latter term being more encompassing and broader. Because 
blended finance seeks to mobilize private finance for the purposes of sustainable 
development, and the Paris Agreement seeks to mobilize finance for low-emission and 
climate-resilient development, blended finance and the Paris Agreement both partly 
govern the same substance matter, i.e. low-emission and climate-resilient development. 
A noteworthy point is that mobilization is not limited to specific forms of finance (debt, 
mezzanine, equity) and that countries have different ways to fulfil their climate finance 
mobilization commitments. This implies that mobilizing climate finance through bilateral 
and multilateral DFIs and MDBs is just one way for states to fulfil their mobilization 
pledges made under the Paris Agreement and other options could include e.g. 
contributions to the climate funds of the UN climate regime, such as the Green Climate 
 
126 Articles 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8 of the Paris Agreement specifically mention sustainable development. 
127 This provision is formatted as enhancing the response to climate change “in the context of sustainable 
development”.   
128 The Agenda introduced the Sustainable Development Goals, and it was adopted with the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/1. 
129 Sustainable Development Goals cover 17 global goals, of which many are mentioned in the preamble of 
the Paris Agreement despite not making an explicit reference to SDGs. These include climate change action, 
no poverty, zero hunger, decent work (and economic growth), gender equality, good health and well-being, 
life below water, life on land, partnerships for the goals, and responsible production and consumption. 
130 Article 2(1) of the Paris Agreement. 
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Fund. However, because the UN climate funds essentially seek to mobilize private 
finance from institutional investors such as pension funds, examining these funds would 
go outside the scope of my research because my research is focused on climate finance 
mobilization from PE/VC investors. 
Now I have established that ‘climate finance mobilization’ and ‘blended finance’ are very 
similar terms and partly govern the same substance matter. Blended finance seeks to 
mobilize finance towards sustainable development, whereas climate finance mobilization 
seeks to mobilize finance for a narrower field, namely low-emission and climate-resilient 
development. Another difference between the two terms is that climate finance 
mobilization highlights the role of public funds whereas blended finance definitions do 
not particularly emphasize any source of finance. However, in the heart of both terms is 
development finance, which should be understood as a component of public finance. 
Thus, ‘blended finance’ and ‘climate finance mobilization partly govern the same area: 
low-emission and climate-resilient development. Investments that would fall under this 
umbrella could include e.g. technological innovations which curb emissions or help local 
communities to adapt to adverse effects of climate change such as water shortages.  
Earlier in my research I stated that the aligned substance matter of ‘climate finance 
mobilization’ and ‘blended finance’ could have implications for the consideration of 
blended finance soft law, and thus PE/VC investors’ perspective, in climate investments. 
Whereas the aligned substance matter area, low-emission and climate-resilient 
development itself does not mean that legal instruments, the Paris Agreement and blended 
finance soft law, covering it should be simultaneously applied,131 the aligned substance 
matter has other consequences. Because it has been now established that blended finance 
is a broader term than climate finance mobilization, blended finance soft law applies to a 
broader range of issues than the climate finance mobilization article. As such, blended 
finance soft law covers also low-emission and climate-resilient development. Thus, the 
application of the Paris Agreement by development financiers when mobilizing private 
finance to low-emission and climate-resilient development does not matter. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that blended finance soft law should be considered by development 
 
131 This is because the aligned substance matter does not automatically mean that the legal instruments 
addressing this area should be simultaneously considered. Even though ‘climate finance mobilization’ and 
‘blended finance’ do govern the same substance matter, this does not mean that the legal instruments 
regulating them, the Paris Agreement and blended finance soft law, should be simultaneously considered 
by development financiers (DFIs, MDBs). Making such an assertation would require understanding 
whether development financiers are required to adhere to the Paris Agreement. 
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financiers (DFIs, MDBs) when mobilizing climate finance into low-emission and 
climate-resilient development. Next, I will examine blended finance soft law instruments 
adopted by the OECD and the IFC outside the UN climate change law regime.  
3.2 Soft law on blended finance 
3.2.1 OECD soft law 
To start, it must be recalled that so far instruments regulating blended finance are soft law 
in nature and have emerged outside the formal UN climate change law regime. Such a 
soft law instrument has been put forward by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). As noted previously, the OECD is an organization shaping 
international and national environmental policies and law through its soft law 
instruments.132 Although the organization’s decision-making body (OECD Council) can 
adopt also adopt decisions binding upon OECD member states, it has rarely utilized this 
alternative in environmental matters,133 and blended finance is no exception to this. The 
OECD’s instruments relevant for blended finance have taken other, softer forms.  
The OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) has developed five 
principles on blended finance emphasizing the importance of commercial sustainability. 
The five principles put forward by the OECD DAC are: i) anchor blended finance use to 
a development rationale; ii) design blended finance to increase the mobilization of 
commercial finance; iii) tailor blended finance to local context; iv) focus on effective 
partnering for blended finance; and v) monitor blended finance for transparency and 
results.134  
Pursuant to the first principle development finance in blended finance should strive 
towards maximizing development impact and outcomes. The second principle seeks to 
address market failures and ensure additionality for crowding in commercial finance. In 
other words, development finance should only be used in sectors and in locations where 
it is most urgently needed. The second principle also highlights the importance of 
concessional, i.e. non-commercial finance, including having a clear strategy with regard 
to the duration and exit of concessional finance. The third principle highlights the 
importance of supporting local development priorities alongside with developing local 
financial markets. This principle entails e.g. working with local financial sector when 
 
132 Friedrich 2013, p. 40. 
133 Kiss – Shelton 2004, p. 92. 
134 OECD DAC Principles of Blended Finance. 
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possible and underlines the role of blended finance in meeting local development needs. 
The fourth principle recognizes that blended finance works when both commercial and 
development objectives can be achieved, and it also underlines respect for different 
mandates. This principle also relates to addressing risk-return profiles to catalyse private 
sector investment and affirms the importance of scalability. In addition, it recognizes that 
development financiers should not compromise on their standards, including international 
standards e.g. in the design, terms and execution of interventions. Lastly, the fifth 
principle on monitoring blended finance for results and transparency recognizes, inter 
alia, the need for agreeing upon a common set of performance indicators in transactions. 
The OECD is not the only international organization that has developed recommendations 
for blended finance investments. Indeed, also the World Bank Group has come up with 
its own recommendations on blended finance, which will be examined below. 
3.2.2 The World Bank soft law 
Strictly speaking, the blended finance recommendations have been given by the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), which is an organ of the World Bank Group. 
The World Bank’s operational policies are ‘internal’ in character, i.e. they are directed to 
the institutional organs that are part of the World Bank Group.135 Such institutional organs 
encompass, for example, the IFC. Some of the five elements of the OECD DAC’s blended 
finance principles are also present in the IFC’s principles guiding blended finance 
operations. The five principles of the IFC’s blended finance recommendations are: i) 
additionality and rationale for blended concessional finance; ii) crowding in minimum 
concessionality; iii) commercial sustainability; iv) reinforcing market failures and v) high 
standards.136 It is notable that these principles have been incorporated into the Enhanced 
Blended Concessional Finance Principles for DFI Private Sector Operations, which have 
been approved by the heads of MDBs and the management of the European Development 
Finance Institutions (EDFI). 
The first principle of the IFC Blended Finance Principles makes a reference to a 
contribution that is beyond what is available and otherwise absent from the market. The 
second principle means that development finance seeks to contribute to catalysing market 
development and mobilization of private finance while keeping the portion of 
 
135 Friedrich 2013, p. 51. 
136 IFC Principles on Blended Finance. These principles have also been referred to in Finland-IFC Blended 
Finance for Climate Program. 
41 
 
concessional finance as small as possible. The third principle on commercial 
sustainability states that the achieved impacts should be sustainable and contribute 
towards commercial viability. The fourth principle states that blended finance should 
address market failures, minimize the risks of market distortions and crowding out private 
finance. Lastly, the fifth principle means that development finance should adhere to high 
standards i.e. in the areas of environmental impact, corporate governance, integrity, 
transparency and disclosure.137 These five principles have gotten, so to say, meat over 
their bones in the Annex I of the previously mentioned Enhanced Principles on Blended 
Finance.138 
These five principles in part anchor the principles put forward by the OECD DAC but the 
OECD’s and the IFC’s blended finance principles also have some differences. Both the 
OECD and the IFC principles mention the rationale for blended finance and the 
additionality of blended finance as principles, while both strive for the effectivity of 
blended finance. The main differences between the OECD’s and the IFC’s principles is 
that the OECD mentions monitoring of blended finance and tailoring blended finance to 
local contexts whereas the IFC’s principles do not mention this. In addition, the OECD’s 
principles recognize the need for effective partnering to achieve desired outcomes. The 
IFC’s principles in their turn make references to commercial sustainability, high standards 
and reinforcing market failures that lack from the OECD’s principles.  
Whereas the blended finance soft law put forward by the OECD and the IFC are not the 
only instruments addressing blended finance or mentioning it, I condemn them to be the 
only instruments put forward by international organizations that have relevance for 
blended finance operations. This assertion is rooted to the fact that other international 
instruments touching upon blended finance, such as the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, do 
not have direct implications for blended finance operations because they are rather 
addressed to the head of states, not blended finance participants. I acknowledge that 
blended finance principles put forward by the OECD and the IFC can be incorporated and 
integrated at other levels, as previously mentioned, but it goes beyond the scope of my 
research to establish how blended finance is implemented in every country. I only want 
to note that such a possibility remains open.  
 
137 IFC Principles on Blended Finance. 
138 DFI Working Group 2019, p. 25–26. 
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Now I have established the relevant soft law on blended finance, it must be examined 
whether these soft law instruments can actually be expected to be applied by development 
financiers in the area where climate finance mobilization and blended finance govern the 
same substance matter. From de jure perspective, blended finance soft law should be 
applied by development financiers when mobilizing private finance for low-emission and 
climate-resilient development. However, making conclusions based on de jure 
perspective alone would be fundamentally flawed, if the application of blended finance 
soft law in real life, de facto perspective, is not examined. I define this to be an issue of 
legitimacy and application restrictions, i.e. conflicts. Because my research focuses on 
development financiers, DFIs and MDBs, legitimacy and possible conflicts are 
considered from the point of view of these entities. First, I will explain why the 
application of blended finance soft law matters for PE/VC investors after which I will be 
clarifying the application of blended finance soft law at a theoretical and practical level. 
3.3 Application of blended finance soft law 
3.3.1 Does soft law on blended finance matter for PE/VC investors? 
In the beginning of my research I asserted that soft law on blended finance matters for 
PE/VC investors. The application of blended finance soft law in blended finance 
investments matters if it adds value to these operations. A critical notion is that blended 
finance instruments only add value if they bring something valuable to operations where 
it otherwise would be missing. Blended finance soft law of the OECD and the IFC capture 
notions which relate to operational issues PE/VC investors need to consider in all their 
impact investments. The issues impact investors need to consider in their investments 
include, but are not limited to, desired impact, growth and scalability. Whereas private 
equity investors can consider these issues seemingly independently in their own 
investments, the issue is different in blended finance operations because in these 
operations, PE/VC investors need to consider also the mandates of DFIs/MDBs and 
comply e.g. with higher environmental and social standards.139 
But do the blended finance principles of the OECD and the IFC take into account these 
concerns, i.e. does the application of these principles matter for PE/VC investors? I assert 
that to a certain extent they do, for which reason blended finance soft law matters for 
PE/VC investors. As noted in Convergence’s study, most successful blended finance 
 
139 The OECD and the IFC Blended Finance Principles. 
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operations have e.g. identified development impact objectives, outputs and outcomes.140 
These are issues touched upon also by the OECD’s and the IFC’s blended finance 
recommendations. For example, the OECD’s principles highlight the importance of 
respecting blended finance participants’ different mandates. This entails a notion that 
blended finance participants, development financiers and private equity investors, must 
consider the other participant’s objectives, which can relate to e.g. outputs. The IFC’s 
blended finance principles also highlight commercial sustainability, stating that 
investments should contribute towards commercial viability. 
Moreover, of the OECD’s principles I would underline elements of principles which 
affirm the importance and scalability and respecting development financiers’ and PE/VC 
investors’ different mandates and agreeing upon common performance indicators. In a 
similar fashion, of the IFC’s principles I would underline the importance of commercial 
sustainability and high standards.141 I highlight particularly the element of commercial 
viability because some other elements are considered by development financiers in any 
case, i.e. not depending on the application of soft law.142 
Without considering issues related to private investors’ perspectives and commercial 
sustainability present in blended finance principles of the OECD and the IFC, it would be 
hard, if not impossible, to make blended finance investments attractive for PE/VC 
investors. Thus, having some guarantees that development financiers indeed consider 
these issues in blended finance operations through adhering to soft law on blended finance 
is valuable for PE/VC investors participating in blended finance. Moreover, if these issues 
would not be considered in ways represented by blended finance soft law, attracting 
capital from PE/VC investors would be little more than a desperate attempt. However, 
considering that blended finance soft law would only have positive implications for PE 
investors, would give a too rosy picture of these instruments. Also, some elements of 
these principles are neutral from the viewpoint of PE/VC investors. Blended finance 
operations, whether utilizing soft law on blended finance or not, should in any case be 
 
140 Convergence 2018, p. 17. 
141 In the Enhanced Blended Finance Principles ‘commercial sustainability’ means high scrutiny of 
commercial viability. In these principles the ‘high standards’ has been understood as adhering to 
international best practice industry standards or guidance, including ESG standards (See, DFI Working 
Group 2019, p. 25). 
142 A prominent example of this is, for example, sustainability. Multilateral development financiers have 
already addressed climate change concerns long before the emergence of the concept of ‘blended finance’. 
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built around attracting private finance. Without this objective in mind, blended finance 
could attract very little, if any, private finance. 
Because blended finance soft law only adds value to blended finance operations for 
PE/VC investors if the principles embodied in blended finance soft law are not otherwise 
considered, it must be noted that some principles are considered by development 
financiers anyway, independently from blended finance instruments. For example, some 
concerns regarding commercial viability are considered by development financiers such 
as DFIs and MDBs due to their impact measurement objectives. Traditionally important 
measurement of development has been job creation143 with some variance in casu. Thus, 
it seems that issues of scalability and growth are in any case considered at least to some 
extent. Moreover, considering that bilateral DFIs have dual mandates, it seems feasible 
to suggest that also concerns related to e.g. commercial sustainability are in any case 
considered at least by bilateral DFIs. Not all principles can be expected to be respected 
by development financiers on the basis of other legal instruments, and such principles 
relate to, for example, respecting PE/VC investors’ mandates. This stems alone from the 
fact that there is no need to consider private investors’ aspirations when they are not 
present in the same operations with development financiers. 
Also, certain risk mitigation/transfer instruments such as insurances from multilateral 
development financiers have been around for several decades so asserting that these 
instruments are dependent on the concept of blended finance or the application of blended 
finance soft law would be deceiving. Whereas certain elements of the OECD’s and the 
IFC’s principles may be valuable for private investors, thinking that all principles would 
provide value for private investors would be pretentious, as some principles have only 
importance for development financiers.144 I acknowledge that the relevance of blended 
finance soft law can vary between blended finance instruments because this soft law 
highlights notions that are particularly valuable when development financiers and PE/VC 
investors invest in the same portfolio companies. This is because both development 
financiers and PE/VC investors seek to influence the management of portfolio companies 
 
143 Massa 2013, p. 2 notes that job creation has been one of the top priorities for development finance 
institutions such as the International Finance Corporation, African Development Bank and European 
Investment Bank. 
144 Such principles include, inter alia, the rationale for the use of blended finance, i.e. attracting private 
finance to investments that otherwise would not attract it (this notion is present in both the OECD’s and the 
IFC’s Blended Finance Principles). Moreover, principles which seek to attract private finance in increasing 
amounts while trying to decrease the amounts of concessional finance cannot be seen as particularly 
interesting from the viewpoint of private investors. 
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particularly through board management – having board members pulling to different 
directions regarding desired performance, impact and growth would make it very hard to 
manage a portfolio company and conduct business. 
As now it has been asserted that the application of these principles does matter for PE/VC 
investors at least to a certain extent, it must be considered whether development financiers 
actually consider blended finance soft law when mobilizing finance for low-emission and 
climate-resilient development.  
3.3.2 Legitimacy of blended finance soft law 
The OECD and the IFC Principles of Blended Finance are strictly speaking addressed at 
providers of concessional finance (DFIs, MDBs) and not private sector investors. The 
previously introduced soft law on blended finance and the Paris Agreement’s climate 
finance mobilization provision both partly govern the same substance matter, low-
emission and climate-resilient development. This is the answer to my first research 
question. My second question related to the application of blended finance soft law by 
development financiers. Obviously, it needs to be considered when mobilizing finance 
for low-emission and climate-resilient development. However, a separate question, and 
my second research question is whether blended finance soft law can actually be expected 
to be applied by development financiers (DFIs, MDBs) in the area where climate finance 
mobilization and blended finance govern the same substance matter? Which factors can 
result in not considering these instruments? An important component of an answer to this 
question is legitimacy.145 In this context I use the term ‘legitimacy’ to describe legitimacy 
among development financiers, DFIs and MDBs. In this regard, a difference must be 
made between the IFC’s soft law on one hand, and the OECD’s soft law on the other 
hand. 
As blended finance and soft law surrounding it are novelties, academic research on the 
influence of blended finance soft law on blended finance operations is not only limited, 
it is non-existent. Thus, assumptions about legitimacy are limited to the influence of other 
soft law instruments adopted by the OECD and the World Bank. As Jürgen notes, the 
legitimacy of soft law instruments can vary in terms of degree of influence and from one 
instrument to another.146 For this reason it cannot be expected that soft law on blended 
 
145 This choice is based on the notion that legitimacy is an important component of enhancing compliance 
with soft law instruments. See, Jürgen 2013, p. 378. 
146 Jürgen 2013, p. 379. 
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finance is followed exactly to similar extent as other soft law instruments put forward by 
the OECD and the IFC. In the past, the World Bank’s soft law has been relatively 
legitimate, despite a ‘mission creep’ outside its relatively narrow development 
mandate.147 However, it must be acknowledged that despite the World Bank’s soft law 
has been relatively legitimate in the past, this doesn’t translate as exactly similar 
legitimacy of the IFC’s soft law particularly when the entities amongst whom legitimacy 
is measured are different. Because the IFC’s principles on blended finance have been 
accepted by the heads of MDBs and the management of EDFI, from this point of view it 
seems feasible to assert that the IFC’s blended finance soft law enjoys a great degree of 
legitimacy among development financiers, both DFIs and MDBs. Moreover, the IFC’s 
blended finance principles can be expected to carry more weight in operations where the 
IFC engages in blended finance operations with national bilateral DFIs.148  
Traditionally, the OECD’s non-binding guidelines have enjoyed great legitimacy among 
those for whom they are addressed at. The OECD’s blended finance principles can be 
expected to be more likely followed by the OECD DAC member countries, such as 
Finland compared to countries which are not OECD DAC member states. In addition, it 
must be noted that the OECD’s non-binding instruments have another dimension: the 
organization’s recommendations have generally been successful in terms of influencing 
the content of national legal systems and policies.149 Indeed, Bayne notes that the soft law 
activities undertaken by the organization have a profound influence on the making of hard 
law outside the organization.150 However, this remark should be approached with caution 
namely because blended finance soft law, being addressed at development financiers and 
not states themselves, will not necessarily take harder forms in the form of legislation. 
This is because the conduct of development financiers is essentially modified through 
softer standards and policies. 
 
147 Jürgen 2013, p. 52. In his research, Jürgen examines soft law in the field of international environmental 
law also examining the role of the World Bank in this field. Jürgen points out to a narrow development 
mandate of the World Bank and to the fact that the Bank has gotten more active in terms of addressing also 
environmental issues. Whereas this ‘mission creep’ raises issues of legitimacy, Jürgen nevertheless 
considers this to be justified, referring to subsequent state practice as well as a modern interpretation of 
development objectives of the World Bank which cannot be considered in isolation from the concept 
‘sustainable development’. 
148 One example of such blending is the Finland-IFC Program on Blended Finance. For more, see Finnish 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2018. 
149 Jürgen 2013, p. 42. 
150 Bayne 2016, p. 350. 
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Often DFIs follow these non-binding recommendations and sometimes even make 
explicit references151 to them. In such cases, these non-binding recommendations can be 
expected to carry more weight. DFIs may be bound to follow blended finance soft law 
such as those of the IFC and the OECD because these soft law guidelines might have been 
incorporated into other policies DFIs are required to follow.152 Moreover, approved by 
the heads of MDBs and European Development Finance Institutions (EDFI) 
management,153 the IFC principles can be expected to have a heavy influence on the way 
blended finance operations are carried out in practice. Because the OECD’s principles 
have not yet been accepted in a similar fashion, they have a little more limited importance, 
although they may shape future policies as has occurred in the past with the OECD’s soft 
law. 
I conclude that from a legitimacy point of view, the OECD’s and the IFC’s blended 
finance principles seem to enjoy legitimacy among development financiers despite the 
degree of legitimacy might vary between the IFC’s and the OECD’s principles. It must 
also be noted that due to the soft nature of these principles, development financiers do not 
have to heed them in all situations. This issue brings us to possible situations where 
blended finance soft law could be disregarded, i.e. conflicts. While reading the next 
section it must be borne in mind that tensions would not render an entire soft law 
instrument useless, but rather the conflicting part of it should be disregarded. 
3.3.3 Blended finance soft law in conflicts 
Because blended finance soft law might be helpful in offering guarantees for PE/VC 
investors that some concerns of the operational side are actually considered in blended 
finance operations, it must be established whether this soft law should be disregarded in 
specific situations, and if so, in which ones. Besides legitimacy concerns, disregarding 
soft law is essentially dependent upon other applicable legal instruments and is related to 
a topic loved by international academics, conflicts154 between legal instruments. Whereas 
 
151 For example, in the Finland-IFC Blended Finance for Climate Program, Finnfund follows IFC Principles 
of Blended Finance. 
152 For example, the European Development Finance Institutions have incorporated Blended Finance 
Principles into their own, enhanced principles that need to be respected by European DFIs. 
153 DFI Working Group 2019, p. 4. 
154 Mehling 2013, p. 20–22 classifies conflicts between legal instruments into four classes: i) conflicts of 
objectives; ii) divergent regulatory approaches; iii) constitutional doctrines and fundamental rights; and iv) 
different regulatory planes. Van Asselt 2014 53–54 in his turn examines situations where interactions 
between regimes could lead to conflicts and proposed following classes: i) incombatible norms; ii) 
diverging objectives; iii) the use of different principles and concepts; iv) opposing economic incentives; 
and v) ‘negative’ diffusion and learning. 
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considering tensions between soft law instruments and binding legal instruments such as 
treaties and their implementation measures might seem artificial, if not even silly, it must 
be recalled that even soft law instruments might get a ‘harder’ status later.155 This is no 
oddity in the field of global environmental governance, where non-binding instruments 
might get a hard law status later.156 Perhaps more importantly, development financiers 
can be bound to follow blended finance soft law based on other grounds, such as 
belonging to associations which require compliance with such standards.157 Keeping an 
eye on such situations, understanding possible tensions makes up a feasible idea. 
However, in their current form, if in conflict with other, binding legal instruments, 
blended finance principles should be disregarded due to treaty interpretation rules. This 
follows from the maxim lex superior derogat lex inferiori, a hierarchically superior norm 
takes priority over the weaker norm.158  
However, it needs to be established whether blended finance soft law could lead to any 
conflicts. To start, from a theoretical perspective two different situations must be 
separated: i) tensions between blended finance soft law and the Paris Agreement and its 
implementation measures; and ii) tensions between blended finance soft law and other 
legal obligations binding upon development financiers (DFIs, MDBs). The reason why 
in the first scenario also the implementation measures of the Paris Agreement must be 
considered is because the Paris Agreement is not self-executing in every country that has 
ratified it. Regarding the first scenario it must be acknowledged that this scenario is not 
always even possible when development financiers are mobilizing climate finance. This 
is because this study makes no conclusions regarding the application of the Paris 
Agreement by development financiers. My study only notes that states can fulfil their 
climate finance mobilization pledges made under the Paris Agreement through DFIs and 
MDBs, which means that in these scenarios conflicts between ‘climate finance 
mobilization’ and ‘blended finance’ could theoretically be possible.  Tensions between 
 
155 Van Asselt 2014, p. 50–51 considers this kind of hardening of soft law as one way how soft law and hard 
law interact. In his research van Asselt provides for two additional ways how soft law interacts with hard 
law, namely, soft law softening hard law obligations and soft law complementing hard law obligations. I 
have left out these two ways of interaction outside the scope of my research because blended finance is yet 
to take ‘harder’ forms. 
156 See, for example, Vihma 2013, p. 155. Vihma makes a reference to the climate regime in addition to the 
biodiversity regime and the ozone regime. 
157 The Association of European Development Finance Institutions is a prominent example of this. 
158 Van Asselt 2014, p. 68. 
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the Paris Agreement and blended finance soft law cannot naturally occur in situations 
where development financiers do not have to follow the Paris Agreement. 
As noted in chapter three, the OECD’s principles are: i) anchor blended finance use to a 
development rationale; ii) design blended finance to increase the mobilization of 
commercial finance; iii) tailor blended finance to local context; iv) focus on effective 
partnering for blended finance; and v) monitor blended finance for transparency and 
results. Of the OECD’s recommendations particularly principles four and five seem the 
most relevant for PE/VC investors engaging in blended finance. The IFCs principles are: 
i) additionality and rationale for blended concessional finance; ii) crowding in minimum 
concessionality; iii) commercial sustainability; iv) reinforcing market failures and v) high 
standards. Of the IFC’s principles I would highlight principles three and five. Below I 
will propose which elements of the OECD’s and the IFC’s principles could lead to 
conflicts between these principles and other legal instruments binding upon development 
financiers, DFIs and MDBs. Despite the OECD’s and the IFC’s blended finance 
recommendations are rather flexible instruments due to their nature as principles, this 
does not mean that they could not be part of conflicts due to this feature alone.159  
3.3.4 Blended finance soft law and the Paris Agreement 
Regarding tensions between blended finance soft law and the Paris Agreement and its 
implementation measures the following can be noted. The terms ‘blended finance’ and 
‘climate finance mobilization’ partly govern the same substance matter, low-emission and 
climate-resilient development. Because the Paris Agreement follows a bottom-up 
approach, it leaves flexibility regarding the implementation of its climate finance 
provision.160 This translates into diverse national implementation measures such as DFI 
 
159 Mehling 2013, p. 21 illustrates possible conflicts that could stem from the use of flexible instruments 
using the overlap of emission trading and voluntary declarations of climate protection done by private 
entities as an example. 
160 This is emphasized also by the broad wording of Article 9(3) of the Paris Agreement. This article makes 
a vague reference to a wide variety of sources, instruments, and channels from which climate finance should 
be mobilized. The fact that the Paris Agreement has provisions taking spots at different places in soft law–
hard law spectrum means that some provisions leave more room for flexibility in terms of incorporation. 
Climate finance mobilization is an example of such a provision. For example, Finland addresses climate 
change through various initiatives, UN funds, partnerships and Finnfund. Even regarding its mobilization 
commitments, Finland does not limit itself to only one instrument. This also reflects the way Article 9(3) 
of the Paris Agreement is phrased. 
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internal policies which accommodate concerns of the Paris Agreement.161 The following 
graph illustrates the situation. 
 
As long as blended finance soft law is consistent with the Paris Agreement’s key objective 
of keeping the rise of global temperature well under 2 degrees Celsius, any tensions could 
not arise. It seems that from the OECD’s principles only the principles regarding 
increasing mobilization levels (principle no. two) and effective partnering (principle no. 
four) could arise any tensions. Of the IFC’s principles commercial sustainability 
(principle no. three) and reinforcing market failures (principle no. four) seem to be 
principles that could lead to tensions. Of the OECD’s principles I considered principle 
no. four and of the IFC’s principles no. three the most relevant from the viewpoint of 
PE/VC investors, because both these principles highlight considering PE/VC investors’ 
perspective and commercial sustainability.  
However, it remains only a theoretical possibility that these elements of blended finance 
soft law would lead to tensions between them and the Paris Agreement. I conclude this to 
be the case because tensions could arise only if blended finance instruments would be in 
conflict with the Paris Agreement’s key objectives, which are rooted in sustainability as 
previously acknowledged. Because blended finance already by definition strives towards 
sustainability and because development financiers are mandated to consider sustainable 
 
161 For example, in Finland the Paris Agreement has been integrated into the Finnish development policy 
and the annually updated memorandum on corporate governance of Finnfund, which provides further 
guidance for the operations. 
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development issues in their operations, I do not see any tensions arising between blended 
finance soft law and the Paris Agreement, and its national implementation measures. 
3.3.5 Blended finance soft law and other legal instruments 
Regarding the second theoretical scenario, conflicts between blended finance soft law and 
other legal instruments binding upon development financiers (DFIs and MDBs), I note 
the following. In the context of bilateral DFIs these other legal instruments could include 
e.g. treaty obligations that states fulfil through their DFIs but they could also include 
weaker commitments which might stem from the applicable national legislation and 
internal policies of DFIs.162 Bilateral DFIs could be bound by e.g. development 
cooperation objectives such as poverty reduction in their investments as well as 
sustainability standards of international entities such as the IFC. The same goes for 
multilateral DFIs and MDBs with a difference that MDBs do not necessarily incorporate 
any specific countries’ climate finance mobilization pledges but rather consider 
sustainability issues proprio motu. 
Whereas giving a perfect overview of all policies and regulations needed to be considered 
by development financiers would be a mission impossible, an assumption about the nature 
of these rules can be made. Because DFIs and MDBs are driven by dual mandates or 
purely development mandates, the applicable laws they follow are primarily 
development-bound or at least do not undermine sustainability. However, it must be 
acknowledged that bilateral DFIs can be sensitive to government policies. For this reason, 
tensions between blended finance soft law and other instruments needed to be considered 
by bilateral DFIs remain possible. However, it seems very unlikely that any tensions 
between blended finance instruments and DFI/MDB commitments would exist due to the 
flexible nature of blended finance principles and the development-geared nature of 
development financiers’ other legal obligations. Moreover, considering that the most 
relevant blended finance principles from the viewpoint of PE/VC investors relate to 
commercial viability and scalability, it is useful to recall that growth is already in the 
minds of most development financiers due to their impact measurement objectives such 
as job creation. 
 
162 For example, the Finnish DFI Finnfund is regulated by national law. In addition, it, similar to other DFIs, 
follows various other internal policies as well as non-binding recommendations set by international 
organizations and agencies such as the OECD and the IFC. 
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In the absence of any conflicting norms, I conclude that there does not seem to be any 
tensions that could lead to disregarding blended finance soft law when private finance is 
mobilized by development financiers (DFIs, MDBs) for low-emission and climate-
resilient development investments. Thus, the fact whether blended finance soft law is 
applied or not relates only to the legitimacy of such instruments among development 
financiers. Because the blended finance soft law from the IFC has been already 
acknowledged and accepted by the highest level of governance of development 
financiers, it seems feasible to suggest that the lack of legitimacy does not impede the 
application of at least the IFC soft law. The OECD’s soft law can be expected to have 
influence too, particularly in guiding formatting other legal instruments covering the field 
of blended finance. Because the soft law instruments on blended finance put forward by 
the OECD and the IFC are principles, which by definition guarantee a degree of 
flexibility, it seems that possible tensions that could theoretically arise between blended 
finance soft law and other legal instruments could be accommodated without the need to 
disregard blended finance soft law. 
3.4 Chapter conclusions 
The Paris Agreement has been noted for recognizing the role of climate finance in 
meeting its key objectives. The Agreement’s Article 9(3) emphasises the role of public 
funds in climate finance mobilization but leaves open the channels, instruments and 
sources from which climate finance should be mobilized. However, it is not only the Paris 
Agreement which guides states’ climate finance mobilization efforts. Outside the United 
Nations climate law regime several soft law instruments addressing private finance 
mobilization have emerged, but these instruments use the term ‘blended finance’. The 
terms ‘climate finance mobilization’ and ‘blended finance’ essentially embody the same 
idea with a difference that blended finance focuses on a broader range of actions 
contributing towards the Sustainable Development Goals whereas climate finance 
mobilization focuses only on climate change adaptation and mitigation activities, namely, 
low-emission and climate-resilient development. Thus, climate finance mobilization 
appears to be a narrower part of blended finance. In both cases, development financiers 
seek to mobilize private finance to developing countries although blended finance does 
not underline the role of public finance in mobilizing private finance. Blended finance 
and climate finance mobilization partly govern the same substance matter, low-emission 
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and climate-resilient development. This answers my first research question regarding the 
alignment of the terms ‘climate finance mobilization’ and ‘blended finance’. 
My second research question was tied to my first question and focuses on the application 
of blended finance soft law in the aligned substance matter area by development 
financiers (DFIs and MDBs). My second research question examined whether blended 
finance soft law can actually be expected to be applied by development financiers in this 
aligned substance matter area. Obviously, this soft law should be applied by development 
financiers when mobilizing private finance into developing countries for low-emission 
and climate-resilient development projects. This is de jure perspective to the application 
of blended finance soft law. I want to highlight that this stems from the broader concept 
of blended finance and is not dependent upon the application of the Paris Agreement by 
development financiers. Low-emission and climate-resilient investments can cover e.g. 
renewable energy projects and projects that help local communities to adapt to the adverse 
effects of climate change.  
Because considering only de jure perspective would give a flawed picture of the 
application of blended finance soft law by development financiers, I also considered 
factors that might hinder the application of this soft law. Thus, I considered de facto 
perspective of the application of soft law on blended finance considering this to be the 
issue of legitimacy and lack of situations where blended finance soft law should be 
disregarded. I considered these issues from the perspective of development financiers 
(DFIs and MDBs). I noted that the IFC’s blended finance principles have already been 
acknowledged by the management of EDFI and the heads of MDBs. Whereas the 
OECD’s blended finance principles have not yet reached a similar status, in the past the 
OECD has been successful in shaping national policies through its soft law instruments. 
Therefore, it seems feasible to suggest that the soft law instruments on blended finance 
enjoy a great degree of legitimacy among development financiers while acknowledging 
that the seeming legitimacy can be sensitive to e.g. the board management in DFIs and 
MDBs. The issue of disregarding soft law in blended finance operations thus seems to be 
primarily an issue of conflicts between blended finance soft law and other legal 
instruments binding upon development financiers.  
I briefly assessed two situations where conflicts involving blended finance soft law could 
arise when private finance is mobilized for low-emission and climate-resilient 
investments by development financiers. The first situation concerned tensions between 
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blended finance soft law and the Paris Agreement, which requires climate finance 
mobilization. I did not see possible causes for conflicts in this relation because the Paris 
Agreement and blended finance soft law principles both are deeply rooted in sustainable 
development. I note that this scenario was only relevant for cases where development 
financiers need to consider the Paris Agreement and its implementation measures.  
The second relation related to possible conflicts between blended finance soft law and 
other legal instruments followed by development financiers (DFIs and MDBs). Whereas 
these instruments are diverse and could theoretically leave more room for conflicts, it is 
unlikely that at least partly development-mandated DFIs and MDBs would need to follow 
other regulations that undermine sustainability. Thus, it seems safe to say that there are 
no situations in which blended finance soft law should be disregarded due to conflicts. 
Thus, blended finance soft law can be expected to be applied when development 
financiers (DFIs, MDBs) mobilize private finance for low-emission and climate-resilient 
investments. This is the answer to my second research question, i.e. when can blended 
finance soft law be expected to be applied by development financiers in the aligned area 
of ‘climate finance mobilization’ and ‘blended finance’. 
The assertation that there seems to be no situations where blended finance soft law should 
be disregarded has practical implications for PE/VC investors. I assert the principles 
contained in the OECD’s and the IFC’s blended finance principles matter because they 
bring up issues that PE/VC impact investors need to consider in all their investments, 
such as scalability, performance standards, and commercial viability. Some of these 
issues are not otherwise considered by development financiers, an example of such an 
issue being respecting the mandates of PE/VC investors. It shall be borne in mind that 
some of blended finance principles are considerations that development financiers need 
to take into account whether they are engaging in blending or not, an example of this 
being sustainability. I also acknowledge that the relevance of blended finance soft law 
might vary between blended finance instruments because the alignment of objectives 
matters particularly in the board management of portfolio companies. In situations where 
development financiers participate in blended finance without being shareholders of 
portfolio companies, blended finance soft law can have less importance. 
If issues brought up by blended finance soft law related to consideration of PE/VC 
investors’ point of view are not considered in blended finance operations, it could 
possibly be detrimental from the viewpoint of profitability. Certainly, neglecting notions 
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contained in blended finance soft law would make it hard to attract private capital to 
investments in developing countries. Thus, the application of blended finance principles 
matters for both private investors and blended finance, at least to a certain extent. 
Simultaneously, it must be borne in mind that these principles should not be given too 
much weight, as they cannot be expected to address macro risks faced by PE/VC investors 
in developing countries such as low-income countries.  
Now I have established the importance and limits of soft law on blended finance, it is 
time to examine which macro risks are commonly associated with investing in developing 
countries such as low-income countries. After providing an overview of different risks, I 
proceed to examine different blended finance instruments available for equity investors 
and how these instruments address macro risks commonly associated with investing in 
developing countries. 
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4. BLENDED FINANCE AND MACRO RISKS 
4.1 Risks associated with investments in developing countries 
4.1.1 Macro risks 
The purpose of my research is not to provide a complete and perfect overview of all risks 
associated with investing in developing countries such as low-income countries. Nor, the 
purpose of my research is to provide a complete overview of risk mitigation/transfer 
instruments available for PE/VC investors who invest in these countries. Rather, the 
purpose of this research and my third research question is to provide an overview of 
blended finance instruments available for equity investors and establish how these 
instruments address risks typically associated with investing in developing countries. 
Whereas the risks explained below generally exist in developing countries, I am writing 
particularly from the perspective of low-income countries. It must be noted that the scope 
of risks varies from a country to country, countries such as low-income countries having 
different characteristics than other developing countries. For example, the less developed 
countries generally have weaker financial markets, and many have undergone conflicts 
during the recent years. 
Risks, of course, are inherent for any investment whether it is in a developing or a 
developed country, but some risks are more prevalent in developing countries than in 
other societies. In this chapter, I have divided different types of risk into risk groups, a 
choice which has been guided by aspirations of a systematic approach. I note that other 
categorizations have been employed e.g. by the OECD.163 In the literature different risk 
groups e.g. political risks can cover different risks,164 so in my analysis I am paying 
attention to the risks covered, and not only to the name of the risk group. 
The emphasis of my research is on the ability of blended finance instruments to address 
macro risks hindering private investment in developing countries such as low-income 
countries. Macro risks cover risks that can affect all businesses operating within a nation, 
and examples of these risks are, inter alia, political risks, regulatory risks, or events 
outside of control of the ruling government such as currency fluctuations. It must be 
 
163 For example, the OECD 2018, p. 79–80 uses two broad risk classes: macroeconomic and business risks, 
and regulatory and political risks. 
164 Surminski 2013, p. 245 makes a reference to the term ‘political risk’, which in the insurance industry 
covers e.g. currency convertibility, expropriations, political violence, breaches of contract and not 
honouring financial obligations. For my research, I have further divided these risks into different sub-groups 
under macro risks for the sake of systematic approach. 
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acknowledged that the factors explaining low flows of private capital into poorer 
developing countries are not necessarily related to climate-friendly investments only, as 
many of the barriers apply also to mainstream finance and development finance as well.165 
This underlines the importance of examining primarily macro risks.  
4.1.2 Macro risks in my research 
Despite much praise and talk surrounding blended finance, capital has not been flowing 
at sufficient rates and several reasons have attempted to explain this. Although 
investments in developing countries may possess positive projected returns, associated 
risks and uncertainty may deter commercial investors from investing in these projects.166 
In the case of private investors, investment decisions are strongly driven by the expected 
risk-return ratio and projects falling short of these exceptions do not likely attract enough 
investments. Blended finance aims to address exactly risk-return ratio, making 
investments in certain developing countries such as low-income countries attractive also 
to private sector investors. For the sake of clarity, I group macro risks into three risk 
groups: regulatory risks, political/institutional risks, and financial (macroeconomic) risks. 
All other risks which could arise in the connection with foreign investment I classify as 
project risks (commercial risks). This approach is similar to Yescombe’s classification 
which divides risks into political/regulatory risks, financial risks (macroeconomic risks) 
and project risks (commercial risks).167 This choice also reflects risk mitigation/transfer 
instruments and their coverage. 
Regulatory risks cover e.g. regulatory uncertainty, tax barriers, and inconsistent tariffs.168 
In the heart of regulatory risk is the host country changing its regulations in a way which 
negatively influences the value of the investment. In the case of low-carbon and climate-
resilient investments regulatory risks could include, for example, a denial of a license to 
operate. Political/institutional risks cover issues related to political instability, corruption, 
and lack of strong and transparent legal systems169. In fragile states political risks could 
entail civil disturbances and wars that destruct a business. Weak institutions make it more 
 
165 Halonen et al. 2017, p. 8–9. 
166 OECD 2018, p. 22. 
167 Yescombe 2014, p. 197. Yescombe employs three categories of risk: project risks (or commercial 
risks), macroeconomic (or financial risks) and political/regulatory risks. My risk classification is different 
from Yescombe’s in that sense I classify political, regulatory and macroeconomic risks further under title 
‘macro risk’. 
168 See, for example: World Economic Forum – OECD 2015, p. 10. World Economic Forum – OECD 
reference concerns the risks whereas the grouping of the risks into four groups is my own choice. 
169 See, for example: World Economic Forum – OECD 2015, p. 10. 
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difficult, if not impossible, for private equity investors to enforce their rights. Considering 
that private equity heavily relies on contract-based rights and obligations, this is a notable 
risk for PE/VC investors. A significant risk is also corruption: according to Transparency 
International, many sub-Saharan countries ranked very high in terms of perceived 
corruption.170 Sub-Saharan countries are almost entirely low-income and lower-middle 
income countries. Research also implies that rule of law, political stability, voice and 
accountability, and property rights positively affect investor confidence despite this 
relationship is also controlled by issues such as real GDP growth, inflation, interest rate 
spread, and country credit ratings.171 
This brings us to financial risks (also known as macroeconomic risks) which being related 
to any investments, are nevertheless perceived to be even higher in developing countries: 
these risks cover risks such as foreign currency risks and countries having poor credit 
ratings.172 As currencies might be highly volatile in developing countries,173 foreign 
investors often prefer to make deals in more stable currencies such as USD or euros and 
this strategy has also been preferred by some DFIs. Volatile currencies can at worst make 
promising deals empty, and private equity investors as a rule mention currency risk as a 
key risk when investing in Africa,174 a home to many low-income countries. Emerging 
economies have seen several currency and fully-fledged financial crises in the past.175 
Under-developed financial markets, including equity markets, may also prove difficult 
and bring uncertainty whether the investor can get their money back.176 I understand this 
to relate to the phase where PE investors are trying to leave the company but due to weak 
financial markets initial public offering (IPO) is not feasible. Among PE investors, an 
initial public offering has been deemed to be the most sought-after exit strategy because 
of its profitability.177 Thus, financial (macroeconomic) conditions might directly affect 
the profitability of the investment due to lack of feasible exit alternatives. 
 
170 Transparency International 2018. A study by Transparency International also made links between the 
level of democracy and perceived corruption. Perhaps unsurprisingly, autocratic countries ranked the 
highest in terms of perceived corruption. 
171 Ayemang et al. 2017, p. 911. 
172 See, for example, OECD 2018, p. 25. The OECD notes that albeit financial risks are associated with any 
investments, they are often exacerbated in developing countries which can stem from the nature of the 
investment or the host country itself. 
173 A prominent example of currency crisis is the hyperinflation in Zimbabwe which began in 2007. 
174 Private Equity International. 
175 Mishkin 2016, p. 338, 343. 
176 World Economic Forum – OECD 2015, p. 10. 
177 Johan – Zhang 2016, p. 136. 
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It has also been noted that financial markets in emerging economies generally suffer from 
lack of orderly secondary market and higher price volatility among other factors.178 Long-
term capital in the form of equity has essentially been non-existent for small and medium-
size enterprises in Africa.179 Many LDCs are located in sub-Saharan Africa with less 
development financial markets180. When judged even by measures applicable to low-
income countries, many African countries have undeveloped financial markets.181 This 
highlights the necessity of addressing particularly financial risks in low-income countries 
such as the LDCs. 
In the literature macroeconomic risks have been explained as risks relating to external 
economic effects that are not directly related to the project.182 Macroeconomic conditions 
in investment host countries have been among the make-or-break factors when it comes 
to the profitability of foreign direct investments, thus being among factors private 
investors should prioritize in mitigating risks associated with their investments. The 
International Finance Corporation has highlighted the importance of macroeconomic 
conditions stating that 60% of the institution’s returns could be attributed to 
macroeconomic conditions.183 Macroeconomic conditions have gone also past individual 
project factors highlighting the need to mitigate risks related to them. 
These are examples of major macro risks associated with investing in developing 
countries such as low-income countries. Now, one might wonder why climate change is 
not mentioned. After all, in the beginning of my research I stated that particularly 
developing countries will be vulnerable for it and that climate risk is in the minds of 
several investors. This is true. Climate change is a phenomenon of macro level and has a 
very diverse set of implications. However, following Yescombe’s risk classification it 
seems that climate change neatly falls to no category. Rather, climate change translates 
into macro risks classified as regulatory, political/institutional and financial 
(macroeconomic) risks. Climate change has implications for the regulatory sector, and it 
can fuel political instability. I acknowledge that climate change can amplify 
macroeconomic (financial) risks because it can negatively affect e.g. GDP growth and 
 
178 Homaifar 2004, p. 355. 
179 Otchere et al. 2017, p. 3. Otchere et al. explore constraints for accessing capital for African firms. 
180 Toroyan – Anayiotos 2009, p. 3. 
181 Otchere et al. 2017, p. 1. 
182 Yescombe 2014, p. 197. Yescombe notes that these risks can also be called financial risks. Yescombe 
employs three categories of risk: project risks (or commercial risks), macroeconomic (or financial risks) 
and political/regulatory risks.  
183 Office of Evaluation and Oversight 2017, p. 18. 
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monetary policy through, inter alia, physical damage and gradual warming.184  Because 
climate change translates into macro risks while being able to amplify existing macro 
risks, also the consequences of climate change fall within the purview of my study.  
Next, I will provide a brief overview of project risks, i.e. commercial risks. Whereas the 
focus of my study is on macro risks, I wanted to provide a brief overview of project risks 
because blended finance instruments can also mitigate these risks. 
4.1.3 Project risks 
Project risks refer to risks that can arise in the context of the investment but are not at a 
macro level. Project risks are also known as commercial risks and are inherent in the 
project itself.185 These risks can be e.g. environmental risks, revenue risks or input supply 
risks.186 Although project risks are not prone only to developing countries, they are as a 
rule different in developed and developing countries. These risks entail e.g. operational 
and contract risk, such risks that have direct implications for a company’s cash flows, as 
well as costs required to make the transaction to happen.187 An example of a notable 
project risk is environmental risk which in the context of low-emission and climate-
resilient development could be e.g. a risk arising from environmental damage. Moreover, 
companies can be held accountable for climate-related damage,188 for which reason 
project risks can be significant from the viewpoint of profitability. However, it must be 
noted that as my research focuses on blended finance and its instruments, environmental 
risks look very different for blended finance investments compared to investments that 
do not consider sustainable development issues to such a high extent.  
Other project-level risks in low-income countries such as the LDCs result from the fact 
that in these countries investors often must be willing to commit extra time and resources 
in the preparatory phase and accept the risk that the business will not get from the 
ground.189 Other problems relate to bankable project pipelines.190 World Economic Forum 
 
184 See, for example, Batten – Sowerbutts – Tanaka 2019 for a comprehensive analysis on the ways how 
climate change can affect macroeconomics. 
185 Yescombe 2014, p. 197. 
186 Yescombe 2014, p. 200. 
187 UNCDF 2018, p. 29. 
188 Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment – Centre for Climate Change 
Economics and Policy, p. 7. It must be noted that litigations related to climate change have focused on 
major carbon emitters. Such litigations are unlikely to occur in cases of blended finance investments where 
venture capital is involved because these investments are of smaller size and because development 
financiers require adherence to high sustainability standards. 
189 UNCDF 2018, p. 35. 
190 See, for example, McKinsey & Company 2016a, p. 30. 
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– OECD list e.g. business model risks, technical feasibility, corporate governance risks, 
funding shortfalls, and liquidity risks as possible risks investors engaging in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in emerging markets face.191 Whereas I draw a line between macro risks 
and project risks, I want to note that blended finance instruments targeting macro risks 
can also indirectly mitigate project risks. Whereas I acknowledge this possibility, I will 
not make a comprehensive analysis regarding this alternative due to the focus of my 
research. Macro risks can also extent to project risks: for example, the lack of weak 
institutions can also translate into higher contract risks, and corruption into corporate 
governance risks.  
The risks listed above, macro risks and project risks, are not something blended finance 
instruments cannot mitigate or transfer. Next, I will examine how blended finance 
instruments address macro risks while paying particular attention to political risk 
insurance schemes and their ability to tame macro risks such as regulatory risks, 
political/institutional risks, and financial (macroeconomic) risks. 
4.2 Financial blended finance instruments 
4.2.1 General 
Blended finance seeks to address those risks that have hindered private sector investments 
into projects and companies in developing countries such as low-income countries, such 
as those risks listed in the previous sections. Various blended finance instruments have 
emerged: junior equity, insurances against political risks, technical assistance, and grants 
being examples of them.192 In my research I will represent the first two instruments, with 
an emphasis on insurances provided by multilateral entities. Some of the instruments are 
provided by both bilateral and multilateral DFIs, whereas some are provided by 
multilateral entities, such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. In addition 
to risk mitigation/transfer instruments offered by bilateral and multilateral development 
financiers, a scheme of instruments provided by private sector actors such as insurance 
companies exits. However, these schemes fall outside the scope of my research, for which 
reason I will not examine them in further detail. 
 
191 World Economic Forum – OECD 2015, p. 10. 
192 OECD 2018 p. 78 also mentions instruments such as credit lines, bonds and technical assistance. I have 
left these instruments outside my research, as I am focusing only on equity investments and not debt 
investments. 
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I group blended finance instruments into non-financial and financial ones, both of them 
being instruments that require private equity investors’ investments to be environmentally 
sound if not meeting even higher environmental standards. When blended finance by 
definition is “strategic use of development finance for the mobilisation of additional 
finance towards sustainable development in developing countries”, the requirement of 
living up to high environmental standards set for private investors engaging in blended 
finance is hardly surprising. A reason behind environmental soundness in the case of 
development financiers (DFIs and MDBs) is partly tied to their mandates which might 
have some variance depending on the institution. The following list detailing blended 
finance instruments available for PE/VC investors aspires to be exhaustive, but it 
acknowledges the possibility that other blended finance instruments193 aimed at private 
equity investors might be under development. Indeed, such development has been 
encouraged in certain sustainable development conferences.194 
4.2.2 Junior equity 
Junior equity195 is one of blended finance instruments and it refers to equity that is 
subordinated to more senior equity meaning that in case of default, the holders of senior 
equity, such as PE/VC firms, will be paid first. In this sense, letting development 
financiers take a junior equity position in portfolio companies protects PE/VC firms from 
the first losses. Secondly, senior equity dividends are different from those of junior equity 
and are often also greater than those of common stock.196 Other blended finance 
instruments can help private equity investors to hedge against risks associated with 
dividend payments.197 Typically, it have been founders, employees and management that 
have taken junior equity – or common stock – positions in portfolio companies.198 Several 
development actors have involved junior equity in their mobilization strategies, among 
these actors the Global Environmental Facility. Despite development financiers take 
junior equity positions in blended finance operations, senior equity positions reserved for 
private sector investors should not obliviously be considered “risk-free” in case of 
 
193 OECD 2018. 
194 An example of such a conference is the one held in Addis Ababa in 2015. The outcome of the conference 
was the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, which encouraged states to develop new financial innovations in 
order to better achieve sustainable development objectives. 
195 Junior equity means  ”common stock” of a company. Senior equity in its turn refers to ”preferred stock”. 
196 Global Environmental Facility, p. 1. 
197 I will address the currency inconvertibility and transfer restriction scheme from the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency in section 4.3.5 of my research. 
198 Talmor et al. 2011, p. 373. 
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company liquidations, as debt is senior to equity.199 This is sensible because private equity 
is in any case a much riskier investment than a debt investment. 
Junior equity offers protection for investors against different risks, which might result in 
company liquidations. I do not consider junior equity to be the go-to option, at least not 
the only one, in countries where macroeconomic conditions are extremely weak, such as 
conflict-affected and fragile states in sub-Saharan Africa. These are mostly low-income 
countries. I am of this opinion because junior equity does not offer protection against 
macro risks. In other words, macro risks pertain regardless of the level of seniority of the 
investor’s position in portfolio companies. Other blended finance instruments such as 
insurance schemes are better tailored to offer protection specifically against macro risks. 
I consider junior equity to best suited to situations where PE/VC investors and 
development financiers such as DFIs have aligned impact objectives and where risks are 
rather at project-level as opposed to macro level. Whereas this excludes quite a many 
low-income countries such as LDCs characterized by volatile currencies, 
political/institutional risk and regulatory risks, this does not imply that these risks could 
not be avoided when other blended finance instruments are employed alongside junior 
equity. 
Junior equity positions bring up impact investing considerations related to desired 
impacts and profits. Development financiers can accept higher risks and lower financial 
returns in exchange for higher development (social, environmental and economic) 
impact.200 As not all PE/VC investors are not willing to comprise financial returns at the 
expense of impacts,201 it must be considered how both objectives can be simultaneously 
fulfilled. It is in junior equity positions where the aligned objectives of development 
financiers and PE/VC investors regarding job creation and technology development can 
result in outcomes that are on the list of PE/VC investors in any case. However, there are 
some variances regarding development objectives between development financiers, and 
the outcomes looked for may differ between DFIs and MDBs.202 Variances exist also 
among PE/VC investors and the aligned objectives must be established case-by-case.  
 
199 Global Environmental Facility, p. 1. 
200 World Economic Forum – OECD 2015, p. 15. 
201 GIIN 2017, p. 10 establishes that 48 per cent of investors surveyed primarily target risk-adjusted, market-
rate returns whereas 31 per cent of investors surveyed targeted primarily below-market rate returns. 
202 Development finance institutions generally have dual-mandates, i.e. creating both financial results and 
impacts. Multilateral development banks on the other hand have development mandates (for instance, the 
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I conclude that impact measurement will be particularly relevant in the context of junior 
equity in the investment assessment phase, whereas it might not be that vital when using 
other blended finance instruments. This does not mean that ESG concerns are not critical 
when other blended finance instruments are employed because all blended finance 
instruments require meeting certain environmental and social standards. The method of 
measuring impact is important to establish in connection with junior equity to determine 
how well a PE/VC investor’s impact objectives align with those of a development 
financier. As acknowledged in the previous chapter, blended finance soft law also refers 
to measuring impact and striving towards high standards.203 Agreeing upon performance 
indicators among development financiers and PE/VC investors helps investors to 
determine whether junior equity would be an option worth considering. Agreeing upon 
performance indicators is also an idea supported by blended finance soft law from the 
OECD. 
4.3 Insurance schemes 
4.3.1 Political risk insurance 
Another blended finance instrument at disposal of PE/VC investors is a political risk 
insurance provided by a multilateral entity. Whereas insurances are provided also by 
private companies, they are fundamentally different from those offered by multilateral 
entities as private companies base their insurances on risk premiums and making profit. 
Multilateral actors in turn have a development mandate and might be in a better position 
to provide insurances, alone due to the fact they also provide financial support for 
developing countries. Of these multilateral organizations, I am focusing on the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which is an organ of the World Bank 
Group. I have chosen MIGA, as it is one of the few actors offering insurances also for 
equity investors. MIGA has also mobilized the most private finance into the Least 
Developed Countries within time period 2012–2017 annually whereas the International 
Finance Corporation ranked second of established institutions.204 Some DFIs may also 
offer guarantees for private sector investments and they differ depending on the size of 
investment and risk among other factors. MIGA was set up to address political risks and 
 
World Bank has two mandates which relate to reducing extreme poverty and to promoting shared 
prosperity). 
203 IFC and OECD Principles on Blended Finance. 
204 OECD – UNCDF 2019, p. 33. The statistics show that after MIGA, the United States and France ranked 
as second and third and the IFC ranked as fourth in mobilizing private finance. 
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despite national insurance programs exist, they can be quite volatile for changes in 
political leadership.205 
MIGA offers four coverage options for equity investors: expropriation cover, war and 
civil disturbance cover, breach of contract cover, and currency inconvertibility and 
transfer restriction cover.206 MIGA refers to these four risk coverages as political risk 
insurances. For the sake of clarity, I will examine expropriation, war, terrorism & civil 
disturbance, breach of contract, and currency inconvertibility and transfer restriction 
coverages separately. Political risks and especially hostility from host countries can be 
really expensive for companies.207 Hostility from foreign governments includes e.g. 
indirect expropriations. MIGA’s insurance coverages cover, inter alia, equity investments 
and for these investments cover is up to 90 per cent.208 An insurance from MIGA comes 
with a price tag, and the premium is usually 1–2 per cent of the size of the investment 
made. MIGA insurance is open for investors from MIGA member states such as Finland.  
It must be duly acknowledged that MIGA can also assist in settling investment disputes. 
MIGA also offers ex ante project development assistance for covered projects. Coverages 
from MIGA assume not only financial and economic viability, but projects earning 
coverage are also expected to be environmentally sound and consistent with the host 
country’s development objectives.209 Nationally Determined Contributions reflect these 
priorities, which are guided by climate change adaptation and mitigation objectives. As 
set out by MIGA itself, “MIGA supports investments that are developmentally sound and 
meet high social and environmental standards”.210 Thus, it seems that already getting an 
insurance from MIGA can help to address regulatory risks related to sustainability. 
Moreover, insurance from MIGA can also mitigate project risks such as environmental 
standard due to making private investors adhering to high social and environmental 
standards. However, because project risks are not on the focus of my study, I will not 
focus on these risks more but recognize that insurances provided by development 
financiers can also mitigate these risks. 
 
205 See, for example, Donovan 2004, p. 12. 
206 MIGA 2019. For debt investors, other products are available, namely coverages of non-honouring of 
sovereign financial obligations and non-honouring of financial obligations for state-owned enterprises. 
207 Gamso – Nelson 2019, p. 2. 
208 Winpenny 2005, p. 29. 
209 Winpenny 2005, p. 29. 
210 MIGA 2019. 
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Multilateral financiers can also provide investors an extra layer of security: host country 
governments are less likely to engage in adverse behaviour against foreign investors when 
a multilateral development financier is present.211 However, it is vital to note that this has 
been affirmed only in the case of MIGA and might not hold up in the case of bilateral 
DFIs.212 Also Tan has noted that political risk insurances (PRI) have a dual-function: in 
addition to offering compensation they have a feature that Tan calls as a broader 
disciplinary function.213 Thus, political risk insurances obtained from MIGA can mitigate 
the possibility that a host country government engages in adverse conduct against private 
equity investors altogether.  
Political risk insurance is one of the oldest options MIGA has to offer for private sector 
investors. Political risk insurance has emerged as a crucial element in the regime of 
international investment offering foreign investors security against certain non-
commercial risks, among which currency and financial transfer risks, contract breaches, 
expropriation, and war and terrorism.214 Despite PRIs can be understood broadly, 
encompassing coverages against political/institutional, regulatory and financial 
(macroeconomic) risks, I explore different parts of PRIs separately for the sake of clarity 
and systemic approach. This choice also reflects the coverage of various insurance 
coverage alternatives MIGA has for private equity investors. Next, I will examine how 
different PRIs from MIGA address regulatory, political/institutional and financial 
(macroeconomic) risks.  
4.3.2 Insurance against expropriations 
In this section, I will focus on MIGA’s expropriation coverage. MIGA’s expropriation 
coverage offers protection from nationalization and from acts of government that make it 
impossible to operate the project through discriminatory measures. Expropriation, and 
particularly its indirect version has been stated to be one of the primary non-commercial 
risks that investors face when investing in developing countries.215 MIGA defines 
expropriation as “any executive or administrative acts or omissions, or any legislative 
 
211 See, for example, Jensen et al. 2019, p. 27. Jensen et al. conclude that reputation costs deter host 
governments from expropriations and breaches of contracts. Home countries and multilateral actors (such 
as MIGA, World Bank) put pressure for the host country to uphold contracts. This view is also supported 
by Friedrich 2013, p. 262. Friedrich makes a reference to loan policies of multilateral agencies such as the 
World Bank in the context of compliance with environmental standards. 
212 Jensen et al. 2019, p. 27. 
213 Tan 2015, p. 177. 
214 Tan 2015, p. 174. 
215 Donovan 2004, p. 1. 
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action (but in all cases excluding any judicial action or omission) in one or a series of 
events attributable to the [h]ost [g]overnment that directly or indirectly” affects 
investors’ ownership or control rights in the guaranteed investment or otherwise deprives 
all or substantially all economic value of the investment, with certain exceptions.216 
Indirect expropriation refers to a series of acts that result in expropriation-like effects due 
to e.g. denial of necessary licenses, introduction of inconsistent tariffs, and introduction 
of regulatory changes that deprive the investor of the value of the investment. 
Acknowledging the possibility of a host country changing its regulations is relevant from 
the viewpoint of low-emission investments, because low-carbon sectors such as the 
renewable energy sector have been and continue to be hugely dependent on public 
policy.217 As a result, regulatory changes e.g. in the field of clean energy can render a 
PE/VC investor’s investment practically worthless. I conclude that the risks that MIGA’s 
expropriation cover offers protection from align well with my classification of regulatory 
risks which cover e.g. regulatory uncertainty (regulatory changes) and inconsistent tariffs. 
MIGA’s expropriation coverage offers protection against certain government actions that 
can either reduce or eliminate control over or ownership of, or rights to the insured 
investment. 
Naturally, MIGA does not offer protection from all regulatory risks. It is critical to note 
that MIGA’s insurance does not protect investor from losses that directly or indirectly 
result from laws, degrees and regulations in force in the investment host country as of 
effective date.218 Similarly, acts or omissions of host country governments are protected 
if they took place before the effective date.219 MIGA therefore limits its insurance scope 
to such acts or omissions that came to the investor as a surprise and of which the investor 
could not have known. This approach is consistent with arbitral tribunals’ approach to the 
issue as arbitral tribunals have often expected an investor to be prudent. MIGA’s approach 
is less stringent in that sense it does not expect investors to anticipate regulatory changes 
unlike many arbitral tribunals seem to expect.220  
 
216 MIGA 2018, p. 15. Exceptions concern e.g. the nature of the government measure. For example, bona 
fide government measures fall outside the scope of indirect expropriations. 
217 Surminski 2013, p. 249 also notes that political dependency and political uncertainty regarding sudden 
policy changes can make investments unprofitable. 
218 MIGA 2018, p. 17. The effective date MIGA refers to is the date when the insurance was underwritten 
between MIGA and the investor. 
219 MIGA 2018, p. 18. 
220 Several authors in the field of international investment law have researched host country’s regulatory 
right and investor protection in this regard. See, for example, Rigo Sureda 2012, p. 79–80 who states that 
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The expropriation coverage’s most notable weakness is that it only focuses on 
expropriations and thus does not extend its scope to any kind of regulatory changes that 
have a negative effect on the value of the investment. However, this aspect arises an 
interesting question regarding the definition of indirect expropriation employed by 
MIGA, namely, does an indirect expropriation as a term have the same content in the 
practice of MIGA as it has in the practice of arbitral tribunals. As already stated, MIGA 
defines indirect expropriation as “any executive or administrative acts or omissions, or 
any legislative action (but in all cases excluding any judicial action or omission) in one 
or a series of events attributable to the [h]ost [g]overnment that directly or indirectly” 
affects investors’ ownership or control rights in the guaranteed investment or effectively 
deprives all or substantially all economic value of the investment, with certain 
exceptions.221  
Bonnitcha refers to indirect expropriation as a situation “in which an investor’s legal title 
is not extinguished but the acts of state are, in legally significant aspects, analogous to 
direct expropriation”.222 In Starrett Housing the Iran-US Claims Tribunal concluded that 
indirect expropriation occurs when property rights “are rendered so useless that they 
must be deemed to have been expropriated”.223 Moreover, Bonnitcha’s research suggests 
that arbitral tribunals interpret differently phrased expropriation provisions in a rather 
similar way: thinking that they all embody the same concept of indirect expropriation.224 
In the practice of arbitral tribunals the economic effect of regulatory changes has been in 
the heart of indirect expropriation assessment.225 In its expropriation definition, also 
MIGA highlights the economic effect of government acts. Therefore, the content of 
expropriation regarding its effects on the investment seems to be in the heart of both 
 
investment tribunals expect foreign investors to have a certain degree of experience and savviness, who 
have conducted adequate due diligence about both the business and country conditions bearing in mind 
how political changes might change them in the future. Nevertheless, Dolzer – Scheurer 2012, p. 169 
conclude that based on the past case-law and literature it seems that the legal environment existing at the 
time of making the investment has been a decisive criterium for the investor’s legitimate expectations. 
221 MIGA 2018, p. 15. 
222 Bonnitcha 2014, p. 230. Bonnitcha represents direct expropriation as a situation “in which a state 
formally transfers or extinguishes an investor’s title to property”, p. 229–230. 
223 Starrett Housing, para. 155. 
224 Bonnitcha 2014, p. 271. 
225 In the practice of arbitral tribunals, expropriation has traditionally required a degree of severity from the 
introduced regulatory changes. This has been an issue of substantial deprivation of the economic value of 
the investment. Vinuales states that some expropriation claims have been dismissed by tribunals on the 
basis that investors failed to establish why environmental regulations have not substantially deprived the 
investment of its value. To determine this, two issues are considered: has the investor been deprived a 
substantial value of the investment; and if so, ii) is this due to the introduction of the regulation. (Vinuales 
2012, p. 308). 
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expropriation definitions adopted by MIGA and arbitral tribunals. MIGA makes a 
reference to control rights and ownership rights which can be essentially be thought to 
mean the same as property rights. 
Thus, the definition of indirect expropriation employed by MIGA seems to be rather 
compatible with the definition adopted in the academic literature and arbitral practice. 
This suggests that the threshold of indirect expropriations adopted by arbitral tribunals 
can be acknowledged when making conclusions about regulatory risks which pertain 
regardless of the expropriation coverage.  Next, I will examine a war, terrorism and civil 
disturbance coverage from MIGA and how this coverage protects foreign private 
investors from political risks. 
4.3.3 War, terrorism and civil disturbance coverage 
MIGA also has a war, terrorism and civil disturbance coverage. This coverage protects 
foreign investors from damage to, destruct to, disappearance of, and loss of tangible assets 
and from total business interruptions which have been caused by politically motivated 
acts of war or civil disturbances.226 In the context of low-income countries, of which many 
are sub-Saharan African LDC countries, and of which many have undergone conflicts in 
the recent past or are still undergoing them, it is good that MIGA’s coverage protects 
foreign investors from political violence resulting from the conduct of other countries as 
well. Because the extent of war, terrorism and civil disturbance risk is heavily tied to 
country circumstances, it is not possible to give estimations of the size class of this risk. 
Nor it is possible due to the methods used in this research. 
Within my risk grouping, this coverage covers political instability in its different forms, 
but does not provide protection from corruption and lack of strong institutions. The reason 
why strong institutions are critical for mitigating risks associated with equity investments 
is because PE investment is essentially a contract-based227 transaction. As such, a PE/VC 
investor’s ability to enforce contracts becomes a critical issue. This is even more crucial 
considering the possibility of PE/VC investors to transfer other risks such as project risks 
by aligning these risks to other parties by means of contracts. If these contracts cannot be 
properly enforced, they become essentially worthless. Although MIGA has an insurance 
protecting lenders from state-owned, sovereign and sub-sovereign enterprises when they 
 
226 MIGA makes a reference to revolution, insurrections, coup d’états, terrorism and sabotage. 
227 Lerner – Schoar p. 10. Lerner – Schoar note that the relationship between PE investor and the founder 
of the company is essentially a contractual one. 
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do not honour their financial obligations, this coverage alternative is not available for 
equity investors.228 Thus, the war, terrorism and civil disturbance coverage from MIGA 
does not help to enforce investors’ rights, and as such, it does not protect investors from 
risks stemming from lack of strong and transparent institutions. For this purpose, MIGA 
has a breach of contract insurance which provides protection from these risks to some 
extent.   
4.3.4 Breach of contract insurance 
Above, I have examined protection offered by MIGA against regulatory risks and political 
instability. MIGA also offers breach of contract insurances. MIGA offers coverage 
against losses that result from a government’s breaches and repudiations of a contract 
with a foreign investor. MIGA offers a breach of contract coverage in cases of arbitral 
award defaults by government when MIGA has determined that the government has failed 
to honour its obligations set out in key project documents.229 These key documents 
include e.g. off take agreements and concessions,230 which set conditions for the investor–
host country relation. Thus, in essence, this coverage offers protection in situations where 
a host state has breached its key obligations and fails to heed a given arbitral award on 
the matter. 
As a rule, this coverage from MIGA sets as a pre-condition obtaining an arbitral award. 
If a government has defaulted in that sense the investor has not: i) been able to obtain the 
award due to the foreign government frustrating its efforts; or ii) the government has not 
paid the amount specified in the award, MIGA starts a dispute settlement e.g. by means 
of mediation to determine whether the government has dishonoured its contractual 
obligations. This issue is solemnly for MIGA to determine. In cases where the 
government has defaulted in a manner specified above, MIGA pays compensation. 
Invoking the dispute resolution mechanism (such as arbitration) set forward in the 
investment treaty is as a rule a precondition for receiving compensation on the basis of a 
contractual breach. MIGA has not put forward criteria for the content of the award, i.e. to 
which extent the award should recognize that the host state has failed to honour its 
financial obligations set out in key agreements concluded between the host state and the 
 
228 MIGA 2019. This coverage is only available for lenders. 
229 MIGA 2019. MIGA determines this through dispute resolution such as arbitration. 
230 The former is an arrangement between producer and buyer regarding upcoming goods and their purchase 
or sale. The latter is a contract between a company and the host government regarding the company’s right 
to operate its business in the government’s jurisdiction subject to certain conditions. 
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investor. Exceptions to the rule requiring investors to obtain an arbitral award concern 
cases where: i) an investor does not have a recourse to a dispute resolution mechanism; 
or ii) there is unreasonable government interference from the host government. MIGA’s 
breach of contract scheme protects investors from situations where a government 
interferes with dispute resolution – which in low-income countries often is arbitration – 
or does not honour the arbitral award, i.e. pay the amount specified in the award to the 
investor.  
In my risk classification MIGA’s breach of contract insurance addresses 
political/institutional risks as it helps to transfer corruption risk and the risk that stems 
from lack of strong and transparent institutions from private investors to MIGA. It is 
noteworthy that in my categorization ‘political/institutional risk’ is partly covered by 
MIGA’s war, terrorism and civil disturbance coverage, and partly by the breach of 
contract coverage. Breach of contract insurance and expropriation coverage are similar in 
that sense that they protect the investor from a foreign government’s conduct: the latter 
from regulatory risks and the former from the government not honouring its obligations. 
The protection of a foreign investor against the possibility of a host country not respecting 
its obligations specified in key project documents can be considered to mitigate/transfer 
also project risks, because offtake agreements can be critical for ensuring financial 
viability of a project. It is notable that the breach of contract coverage only limits itself to 
investor-state relation, and other relations fell outside the scope of this coverage. As a 
result, contractual obligations not honoured by third parties such as company founders 
are not covered. These contractual breaches can be determined e.g. in arbitration between 
the investor and the third party in breach of obligations. 
But who should choose a breach of contract coverage for their investment? Breach of 
contract and regulatory risk cover require significant amount of legal input, making these 
insurances rank high in transaction costs.231 Thus, they might not be a feasible option for 
smaller venture capital investments. However, a breach of contract insurance might help 
to hedge against project risks such as revenue risks due to requiring the host country to 
respect its commitments defined e.g. in offtake agreements and concessions. For this 
reason, a breach of contract coverage might be warranted in developing countries such as 
low-income countries. 
 
231 Winpenny 2005, p. 55. 
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4.3.5 Currency inconvertibility and transfer restriction scheme 
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency also provides protection from a  foreign 
investor’s inability to convert or transfer dividends or loan payments due to foreign 
exchange restrictions.232 This coverage protects foreign investors from the inability to 
transfer local currencies to hard currencies such as dollars, euros and yens and/or 
transferring hard currencies outside the host country where such situations is due to a 
government action or omission. Such actions or omissions can stem from a wide range of 
issues. MIGA includes capital, interest, principal, profits, royalties, and other remittances 
under this coverage. As such, in terms of subjects covered, this coverage is quite 
comprehensive, and by including royalties under the protective umbrella this coverage 
seems a feasible option also for innovative companies. The price of premium for this 
coverage varies depending on e.g. the volatility of host country currency rate among other 
factors.233 
I acknowledge that this coverage addresses risks that fall into the class of financial 
(macroeconomic) risks in my risk grouping. However, saying that this coverage covers 
all financial (macroeconomic) risks associated with investing in developing countries 
such as low-income countries would be a faulty assertation in its core. This coverage does 
not protect foreign investors from currency depreciation, which can occur as a result of 
different causes. For example, currency depreciation can occur because of a monetary 
policy or a central bank intervention but it can also be a consequence of political 
instability. Currency risk has several implications for PE investors, as it can affect the 
price of assets, and the net value of assets. Thus, it seems that MIGA’s currency 
inconvertibility and transfer restriction coverage leaves open risks resulting from 
currency depreciation, which can be detrimental for private equity investors when left 
unaddressed. As a consequence, private equity investors engaging in blended finance 
wanting to hedge against currency risk could explore foreign exchange (FX) risk 
instruments available in the private market. 
Besides currency depreciation, the currency inconvertibility and transfer restriction 
coverage from MIGA does not afford protection from financial risks which are related to 
weak financial markets. This means that the coverage will not make an IPO any more 
feasible option as it is without a coverage. This coverage also does not provide protection 
 
232 MIGA 2019. 
233 Homaifar 2004, p. 350. 
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from other financial (macroeconomic) risks often present in developing countries such as 
low-income countries. As such, this coverage from MIGA does not address most financial 
(macroeconomic) risks associated with investments in developing countries such as low-
income countries, which have been infamous for their weak financial markets. Moreover, 
considering the possibilities how climate change can weaken macroeconomic conditions 
even further, MIGA’s insurances leave significant financial (macroeconomic) risks 
unaddressed. 
4.3.6 Risks left unaddressed by blended finance instruments 
Above I have provided a brief overview of various macro risks (regulatory, 
political/institutional, and financial/macroeconomic risks) and project risks commonly 
associated with investing in developing countries, examined from the viewpoint of low-
income countries in particular. I have also considered various blended finance 
instruments, i.e. ways to mobilize private finance into developing countries by means of 
rebalancing risk-return ratios which have in the past deterred private investors from 
investing in developing countries. Despite various risk mitigation/transfer instruments 
exist, some macro risks nevertheless persist. To start, blended finance alternatives 
targeting currency risk seem to be the most limited at least for equity investors. Thus, 
currency depreciation still is a considerable risk for PE/VC investors engaging in foreign 
investment in low-income countries. MIGA’s currency inconvertibility and transfer 
restriction scheme also leaves most macroeconomic risks unaddressed such as those 
resulting from weak financial markets. This translates into weaker exit possibilities, 
limiting opportunities where an IPO is a feasible exit alternative. 
Junior equity can absorb first losses in cases of company liquidations, providing a layer 
of security for PE/VC investors holding a senior equity position in portfolio companies. 
Nevertheless, alone junior equity seems inadequate to offer protection against macro 
risks. This stems from the fact that financial (macroeconomic) risks such as currency 
fluctuations and regulatory risks such as influential regulatory changes can render the 
investment virtually worthless, and without explicit protection against macro risks a 
portfolio company might need to be liquidated. Moreover, the appropriateness of other 
blended finance instruments stems from the fact that multilateral development financiers 
can impede expropriations from occurring in the first place due to a broader disciplinary 
function of political risk insurances. Thus, it cannot be said that junior equity offers 
protection from macro risks. Rather, junior equity offers protection against the 
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consequences of macro risks against which a PE/VC investor has failed to obtain adequate 
protection, such as a political risk insurance. 
Regarding regulatory risk, i.e. a chance that a host country changes its regulations in a 
way that negatively affects the value of the investment of a foreign investor, a question 
regarding the scope of protection of MIGA’s expropriation coverage arises. This stems 
from the fact that not all regulatory changes having a negative impact on the value of the 
investment result in indirect expropriations and a vast majority of damages are non-
compensable234. As a consequence, there will be plenty of situations where host countries 
can adopt regulations negatively affecting the value of the investment, but these 
regulations do not lead to an obligation to compensate the damage caused for foreign 
investors. Regulatory risks not meeting the threshold of indirect expropriations thus 
persist regardless of MIGA’s expropriation insurance. It must also be noted that an 
expropriation insurance still expects prudency from the foreign investor in terms of being 
aware of the current state of regulations. The expectations regarding prudency required 
from a foreign investor are nevertheless more relaxed when obtaining an expropriation 
coverage from MIGA compared to the degree of prudency required by arbitral tribunals. 
Political/institutional risks are partly covered by MIGA’s breach of contract coverage and 
partly by its war, terrorism and civil disturbance coverage. Main issues with MIGA’s 
coverages available for equity investors aiming at mitigating and transferring 
political/institutional risks relate to the requirement of obtaining an arbitral award in most 
cases as well as to the problems regarding contract enforcement. Whereas MIGA provides 
a coverage against breaches of contracts in the investor-state relation, relations between 
investors and third parties such as company founders are not covered. Thus, when PE/VC 
investors try to transfer project risks (such as environmental risks) to third parties,235 they 
can face difficulties when enforcing their rights. Taking into account weak judiciaries in 
low-income countries as well as high degrees of corruption, this remains problematic. 
MIGA’s breach of contract thus does not remove institutional weaknesses associated with 
low-income countries and their judiciaries but rather offers protection against these risks 
 
234 In the case-law of arbitral tribunals, the threshold for indirect expropriations has been set remarkably 
high. Certainly, only in few cases compensation has been awarded on the basis of indirect expropriations. 
Arbitral tribunals have put heavy weight on the effects of adopted regulations, requiring them to deprive 
the investor virtually the whole value of the investment. Vinuales 2012, p. 307 argues that changes to 
general regulations are the rule and will only rarely result in indirect expropriations. 
235 Yescombe 2013, p. 198 makes a reference to allocating risks to the extent possible to appropriate parties 
in the provisions of project contracts. 
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only in part of all cases, namely in the investor-state relation. Political/institutional and 
regulatory risk protection can also come with a hefty price tag due to high transaction 
costs.  
Next, I will provide a brief overview of the relationship of blended finance soft law and 
macro risks, and regulatory risks in particular. I will take a look at regulatory risks blended 
finance instruments leave unaddressed in relation to low-emission and climate-resilient 
investments, i.e. climate finance investments. 
4.4 Scope of existing regulatory risks 
4.4.1 Blended finance soft law and macro risks 
Above I have concluded that the biggest macro risks left partly unaddressed by blended 
finance instruments are financial (macroeconomic) risks, and regulatory risks. In 
addition, weaknesses regarding contract enforcement in relationships between a foreign 
investor and actors other than states, i.e. third parties remain problematic. Due to existing 
financial (macroeconomic) risks, feasible exit opportunities remain more limited because 
financial markets are weak, which can have implications for the profitability of 
investments. Moreover, currency depreciation can affect the value of assets among other 
factors. However, albeit blended finance instruments (junior equity and political risk 
insurances) cannot necessarily mitigate/transfer these risks it should not be concluded that 
blended finance soft law could not affect the scope of these risks.  
The previously addressed blended finance soft law, i.e. blended finance principles from 
the OECD and the IFC, can also affect the scope of macro risks faced by private equity 
investors in developing countries such as low-income countries. In chapter three I 
concluded that blended finance soft law matters for PE/VC investors as it adds value to 
blended finance operations because of considering the key objectives of PE/VC investors. 
Whereas blended finance soft law itself cannot address financial (macroeconomic) risks 
left unaddressed by blended finance instruments, these soft law instruments signal an 
active role for development financiers in enhancing the quality of local financial 
markets236 which can be presumed to contribute to the development of local financial 
markets in developing countries. Thus, blended finance can indirectly contribute to an 
increasing number of feasible exit options in developing countries. This is because 
 
236 Both the OECD and the IFC Blended Finance Principles mention contributions to the development of 
local financial markets as blended finance principles. See, the third principle of the OECD Blended Finance 
Principles and the fourth principle of the IFC Blended Finance Principles. 
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stronger financial markets make IPOs more attractive exit alternatives. Whereas strong 
financial markets are not itself valuable for private equity investors, they enable exit 
alternatives which can be more profitable and feasible compared to other exit alternatives. 
As such, developing local financial markets is valuable also for private equity investors. 
However, it would be a faulty assertation that blended finance soft law mitigates financial 
(macroeconomic) risks such as those associated with weak financial markets often 
associated with low-income countries. Whereas blended finance soft law can mention an 
objective of striving towards financial markets development, the extent to which 
development financiers can do this remains unclear and should be subjected to further 
studies. Moreover, it remains questionable whether market development could be 
achieved within the investment horizon of PE/VC investors participating in blended 
finance. Thus, it cannot be concluded based on my research alone that soft law on blended 
finance mitigates financial (macroeconomic) risks associated with investing in low-
income countries. Whereas blended finance soft law pays attention to the duration and 
exit opportunities of concessional, i.e. non-commercial finance, it stays silent about exits 
of commercial finance. Blended finance soft law, however, mentions paying attention to 
the perspective of private investors. It remains to be seen to which extent the perspective 
of PE/VC investors is considered in blended finance investments of the future. Therefore, 
blended finance instruments considered together with blended finance principles of the 
OECD and the IFC still leave financial (macroeconomic) risks unaddressed.  
Although blended finance soft law does not directly deal with regulatory risks, it still has 
connections also to regulatory risks. Because blended finance engagement is essentially 
tied to sustainability, regulatory risks look very different for blended finance investors 
compared to other investors. 
4.4.2 Blended finance and existing regulatory risks 
Blended finance instruments, or political risk insurances to be exact, leave significant 
regulatory risks unaddressed because the threshold of indirect expropriations has 
generally been set high. The grey area where host countries can adopt regulations 
negatively affecting the value of foreign investors’ investments without this resulting to 
indirect expropriations and thus compensation is large and encompasses both 
environmental and non-environmental regulations. When PE/VC investors engage in 
low-emission and climate-resilient development projects, a portfolio company’s host 
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country’s ability to maintain the stability of the regulatory framework becomes critical to 
assess because regulatory changes related to the protection of the environment or climate 
can significantly affect the value of the investment made. This is particularly the case 
when portfolio companies operate in the field of low-emission and climate-resilient 
development. This stems from the fact that energy sector continues to be dependent on 
policy. 
Whereas Steckel – Jacob note that the risk that a host country reverses its climate policies 
could be added to PRI schemes or could be obtained from a development bank,237 I note 
that at least the MIGA’s expropriation scheme namely concerns only expropriations and 
not any kind of regulatory changes. I assert that there are three situations that might be 
relevant from the viewpoint of foreign investors in relation to climate related regulatory 
changes: i) tightening regulations to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement; ii) 
withdrawing from the Paris Agreement; and iii) failing to enforce/implement the Paris 
Agreement. The first situation seems to have a rather limited relevance because private 
investors are already required to comply with rather high sustainability standards when 
engaging in blended finance. On the other hand, it should not be assumed that PE 
investors engaging in blended finance should ignore the Paris Agreement. 
The reason why private investors engaging in blended finance should not neglect the Paris 
Agreement relates to the status quo and the inadequacy of climate action. It is clear the 
current level of climate action under the Paris Agreement is clearly not in par with its key 
objective,238 and more ambitious239 action is required. Whereas the key objective of the 
Paris Agreement seeking to keep the rise of global temperature well under 2 degrees 
Celsius is not strictly speaking binding upon non-state actors such as private investors, 
the provision will certainly determine which projects will stay financially viable. As 
Boissinot – Samama estimate, policy changes and shifts in both consumer and investor 
behaviour will likely directly affect not only companies but also industries, possibly 
spanning through the economy.240 Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that more climate-
related legislation is coming up, as countries are fulfilling their pledges made under the 
Paris Agreement. Whereas this might have fewer implications for PE investors engaging 
 
237 Steckel – Jacob 2018, p. 26. 
238 Höhne et al. 2016, p. 19. Also, more recent sources of data are consistent with this finding from 2016. 
239 Article 3 of the Paris Agreement makes a reference to ambitious action as defined in several other articles 
of the Agreement. 
240 Boissinot – Samama 2018, p. 184. 
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in blended finance, which by definition is tied to sustainable development, the possibility 
of tightening climate policies must nevertheless be acknowledged. This is because tighter 
regulations could e.g. translate into denials of operating licenses. 
It seems clear that private equity investors cannot neglect regulatory changes that may 
take place when countries are adopting tighter climate-related regulations. Low-income 
countries seem to be no exception to the rule. For example, much of the recent regulatory 
and policy actions in the LDCs have focused on building frameworks aiming to both 
promote and enable green growth and low-carbon and climate-resilient development.241 
The issue is nevertheless not as simple as it looks, and changes in political leadership in 
low-income countries might have a detrimental effect on climate policies, and as a 
consequence, climate-related activities. Thus, private investors engaging in blended 
finance cannot blindly rely on the host countries’ compliance with the Paris Agreement. 
This brings us to questions regarding withdrawing from the Paris Agreement and failures 
to enforce and implement the Paris Agreement. 
Whereas withdrawing from the Paris Agreement is possible and the first withdrawal from 
the Agreement has already been seen, a more likely occasion is that a host country fails 
to comply with the Agreement. The Paris Agreement is a relatively soft treaty and it 
contains no sanctions of breaches of the Agreement. Its provisions and GHG emission 
reduction goals do not oblige country parties to heed them.242 As Bergkamp notes, the 
gap between the Paris Agreement-style collective ambition and individual country 
obligation seeks to apply pressure for national democracies.243 However, there are no 
guarantees that this will work. Furthermore, Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs) are not binding upon the countries that adopted them. These issues highlight the 
notion that foreign investors cannot expect host countries to blindly follow the Paris 
Agreement and comply with it. 
However, simply assuming that states will not comply with the Paris Agreement’s 
provisions due to its soft nature and lack of sanctions is as naïve as is the opposite. Article 
9(6) of the Agreement makes a reference to a global stocktake which takes account of 
information provided by developed country parties regarding climate finance efforts. As 
Rajamani notes, rigorous oversight mechanisms, including global stocktake, positively 
 
241 Nachmany 2017, p. 64. 
242 Ogbumgbada 2016 for critical notions of the Paris Agreement. 
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impact states’ compliance with their commitments and their ability to demand compliance 
from others.244 Other mechanisms present at the Paris Agreement, such as transparency, 
have been acknowledged to positively influence compliance with treaty obligations.245 
Although a degree of uncertainty always remains when discussing compliance 
beforehand,246 the climate package adopted at COP 24 in Katowice took concrete steps 
to facilitate and promote compliance with the Paris Agreement.  
Thus, although the Paris Agreement raises questions regarding states’ compliance with it, 
the issue should not be considered black or white and it is rather one of the famous shades 
of grey. Whereas the Paris Agreement entails no sanctions for its breaches, notions 
regarding compliance enhancing factors as represented in the academic literature must be 
noted. Because the issue of compliance is not a straight-forward one, PE/VC investors 
engaging in blended finance cannot blindly rely on the host country’s compliance with 
the Paris Agreement for which reason regulatory changes even in the climate change law 
sector remain possible. For this reason, it is reasonable to ask how climate-related 
regulatory risks can be managed by other means than blended finance instruments. 
4.4.3 Means to manage regulatory risks 
Whereas blended finance instruments cannot mitigate or transfer all risks, this should not 
be interpreted to mean that these risks could not be managed by other means. Whereas 
MIGA’s expropriation coverage is rather limited and only in limited cases foreign 
investors can receive compensation based on occurred expropriations, there are other 
means to receive compensation due to regulatory changes introduced by a host country 
government. This is an issue of international investment law and further research should 
be conducted to determine the scope of existing regulatory risks related to the Paris 
Agreement that remain for private equity investors engaging in blended finance. 
Regulatory risks left unaddressed by blended finance instruments have remarkable 
connections to international investment law regulating the relationship between a foreign 
investor and a host country. As previously acknowledged, besides the alternative of a host 
country tightening regulations under the Paris Agreement, an option regarding the host 
country leaving the Agreement or failing to implement or enforce the Agreement remain 
 
244 Rajamani 2016, p. 343. 
245 See, for example, Bodhe 1996, p. 13–38. 
246 Steckel – Jacob 2018, p. 23–25 discuss political de-risking associated with countries’ ability to follow 
through their climate policies. 
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possible. For example, when a host country decides to depart from the Paris Agreement, 
this could lead to invoking the fair and equitable treatment standard247 present in most 
international investment agreements. Similarly, the fair and equitable treatment standard 
can be expected to come in play when a host country having ratified the Paris Agreement 
fails to implement and enforce it. Therefore, further research could be conducted e.g. on 
the role of the Paris Agreement in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). 
Another interesting question relates to the role of NDCs in ISDS, because these national 
plans are not formally speaking a part of the Paris Agreement. Whereas the status of 
NDCs in investor-state arbitration remains unclear, they are expected to play a role in the 
future. In the literature it has been estimated that Nationally Determined Contributions 
will “no doubt be closely scrutinized by states (and tribunals)” to determine the scope of 
investor obligations and host countries’ rights to prevent GHG emissions from 
investments.248 However, the role of NDCs is yet waiting to receive attention in investor-
state arbitrations. Assessing the content of NDCs might step in e.g. when assessing the 
extent of host country’s regulatory right, i.e. did a host country have the right to introduce 
regulatory changes that negatively affected the value of the investment. This would be an 
issue of legitimate expectations standard. 
Other venues where international investment law could interact with the Paris Agreement 
in a way relevant for blended finance operations remain possible. Nevertheless, it 
deserves to be recalled that the links between the Paris Agreement and international 
investment law cannot be said to mitigate risks, as they rather relate to anticipating 
outcomes of investor-state arbitration.  
4.5 Chapter conclusions 
In this chapter, I have examined risks associated with investing in developing countries 
such as low-income countries. For the sake of clarity, I grouped these risks into two 
categories: macro risks and project risks, dividing the former into three sub-categories: 
regulatory risk, political/institutional risk, and financial (macroeconomic) risks. To 
 
247 Fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard has two key components from the indirect expropriation 
point of view: i) providing a stable regulatory framework; and ii) the well-known legitimate expectations 
standard. FET standard can, due to its connection to regulatory changes via legitimate expectations 
component and its application in cases of unstable regulatory environment offer protection against indirect 
expropriations. Of different investor protection clauses, FET clause has become perhaps the most contested 
provision and a ‘catch all’ clause when expropriation claims fall short. 
248 Miles – Swan 2017, p. 120. 
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project risks belong e.g. environmental risks and revenue risks. Whereas my research 
focused only on macro risks, I chose to feature project risks for the sake of understanding 
which risks are not covered by blended finance instruments as well as acknowledging that 
blended finance instruments seeking to mitigate/transfer macro risks can indirectly also 
affect the scope of project risks. Of the risks generally associated with investing in 
developing countries, I sought to establish how blended finance instruments 
accommodate these risks. For equity investors two blended finance instruments were 
available: junior equity and political risk insurance schemes. Of these insurance schemes, 
I focused on coverages offered by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. 
Based on my research on different macro risks and how blended finance instruments 
address them, I note the following. Junior equity might seem an attractive option for 
PE/VC investors engaging in blended finance because development financiers and PE/VC 
investors generally seem to have rather aligned objectives. However, junior equity does 
not offer protection against macro risks per se but rather offers protection against PE/VC 
investors’ failure to mitigate/transfer macro risks through other means, such as political 
risk insurance schemes.  
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency offers protection against macro risks, but 
it does not offer a cover-it-all solution against all macro risks. Financial (macroeconomic) 
risks such as currency depreciation remain largely unaddressed by blended finance 
instruments available for equity investors. This is because MIGA’s currency 
inconvertibility and transfer restriction coverage does not shield foreign investors from 
currency depreciation risks. Thus, equity investors wanting to hedge against these risks 
could want to examine options available in the private market. Considering that MIGA’s 
currency inconvertibility and transfer restriction has a rather limited coverage, it does not 
address most macroeconomic risks such as those stemming from weak financial markets. 
Because of this, chances that an IPO is a feasible exit alternative remain rather limited, 
and thus, as a rule foreign investors need to rely on other, perhaps less profitable, exit 
alternatives. Whereas blended finance soft law mentions an objective of developing local 
financial markets in developing countries, it cannot be said that such actions mitigate 
financial (macroeconomic) risks in the blended finance operation at hand. It must be also 
noted that climate change can worsen macroeconomic conditions even further, making 
existing macroeconomic conditions issues that certainly warrant careful attention. 
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Another notable risk left partly unaddressed by blended finance instruments is regulatory 
risk, such as regulatory uncertainty, because only indirect expropriations are covered by 
MIGA’s expropriation coverage. Not all regulatory changes negatively affecting the 
value of the investment result in indirect expropriations, because in a majority of cases 
the threshold of severity is not exceeded, and compensation as a result of indirect 
expropriation is not awarded. MIGA’s expropriation coverage also assumes a certain 
degree of prudency from foreign investors regarding awareness of existing regulations in 
a host country, although expectations regarding foreign investors’ prudency are not as 
stringent as adopted by arbitral tribunals. Previous studies have also shown that political 
risk insurances such as those offered by MIGA can serve a broader disciplinary function 
and provide protection from the host country government. As such, insurance schemes 
can provide an extra layer of security for PE/VC investors engaging in blended finance. 
Whereas political/institutional risks are to a certain extent covered, some gaps in 
protection remain. The war, terrorism and civil disturbance coverage from MIGA offers 
protection against political violence and therefore, it might be warranted in most low-
income countries, many of which have undergone conflicts in the recent past. This 
coverage together with the breach of contract coverage from MIGA offers protection 
against political/institutional risks. The most problematic issues regarding the breach of 
contract insurance relate to the limited scope of protection – MIGA only covers breaches 
of contract by the host country and not those done by third parties, such as company 
founders. Thus, when PE/VC investors want to use contracts to transfer risks by allocating 
them to third parties, these contractual obligations do not fall within the scope of MIGA’s 
breach of contract coverage. MIGA’s breach of contract coverage does not remove the 
risk associated with weak institutions when it comes to relationships between third parties 
and the foreign investor. Therefore, it might be hard to uphold these contracts in countries 
which have suffered from high degrees of corruption, which is common for most low-
income countries. In addition, the breach of contract coverage from MIGA comes with 
high transaction costs. This is also because the breach of contract insurance from MIGA 
as a rule requires foreign investors to resort to arbitration if compensation is wanted. 
It must be borne in mind that blended finance instruments can also mitigate project risks 
such as environmental risks due to the stringent environmental and social policies of 
development financiers participating in blended finance. Moreover, blended finance 
instruments can also help to mitigate project risks such as revenue risks due to the 
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experience of multilateral development financiers in developing countries. This might 
also stem from the broader disciplinary function of political risk insurance schemes, a 
topic which has been examined in other studies than this one. The presence of 
development finance providers in blended finance operations offers a certain degree of 
security for private investors because host countries are less likely to engage in adverse 
behaviour when multilateral development financiers are present. However, because these 
appear to be consequences of the involvement of development financiers in blended 
finance operations and not consequences of blended finance instruments or blended 
finance soft law, these issues were not researched in further detail in this study and were 
rather just interesting points to keep in mind. 
I also noted that regarding regulatory risks it must be acknowledged that regulatory risks 
related to changing climate policies remain different for PE/VC investors engaging in 
blended finance than for other private equity investors. Whereas tighter climate policies 
can be expected due to the Paris Agreement, I asserted that tighter climate regulations are 
not the biggest threat for PE/VC investors engaging in blended finance because blended 
finance instruments require adherence to relatively high environmental standards. 
However, PE/VC investors cannot blindly expect host countries to comply with the Paris 
Agreement. This stems from the nature of the Agreement which accommodates harder 
and softer obligations and entails no sanctions for breaches of its provisions. 
Nevertheless, questioning the efficacy of the Paris Agreement to promote compliance 
with the obligations contained in the treaty text just because of the soft nature of the 
Agreement would also be naïve. The compliance with the Paris Agreement is not a black-
or-white type of issue, and the Agreement contains factors positively associated with 
enhancing compliance with treaty obligations. Although host countries’ compliance with 
the Paris Agreement might remain unclear, this does not mean that regulatory uncertainty 
or regulatory changes would automatically harm the foreign investor engaging in low-
emission and climate-resilient projects. This simply means that such issues must be 
managed through other venues, a notable option being investor-state dispute settlement. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Relationship between blended finance and the Paris Agreement 
As my first research question I asked whether the Paris Agreement’s term ‘climate 
finance mobilization’ implicitly refers to blended finance. I concluded that ‘climate 
finance mobilization’ is a narrower definition of ‘blended finance’, and in the area of low-
emission and climate-resilient development they govern the same substance matter. 
Because blended finance emerged outside the United Nations climate change law regime, 
I considered the recommendations of OECD and the International Finance Corporation. 
The soft law on blended finance put forward by these two organizations details principles 
that should guide blended finance operations. These principles address, inter alia, 
commercial viability, consideration of private investors’ objectives, scalability, and 
adherence to high environmental, social and corporate governance standards.  
I asserted that these principles are worth consideration, as neglecting the notions 
embodied in them could be detrimental for private equity investors. Failure to consider 
the aspirations of PE/VC investors would make blended finance operations unattractive 
to private investors, the very opposite blended finance seeks to achieve. However, it must 
be noted that some of the concerns embodied in blended finance principles such as 
sustainability and high standards need to be considered by development financiers in any 
case, regardless of engaging in blended finance. Nevertheless, issues related to the 
consideration of the perspective of private equity investors are less likely to be considered 
by development financiers without engaging in blended finance. Thus, the application of 
blended finance principles to blended finance operations matters for PE/VC investors to 
a certain extent, although it is not the only determinant. 
However, the mere fact that the soft law instruments concerning blended finance are not 
legally binding raise additional questions regarding their application in blended finance 
investments. Thus, as my second research question I considered can the blended finance 
soft law actually be expected to be applied by development financiers in the area where 
blended finance and climate finance mobilization govern the same substance matter. This 
aligned area is low-emission and climate-resilient development, as affirmed in the answer 
to my first research question. I considered that the application of these recommendations 
depends on two issues: legitimacy and the lack of situations where these 
recommendations should be disregarded. I examined the application of blended finance 
soft law from the viewpoint of development financiers (DFIs and MDBs). I suggested 
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that these recommendations generally enjoy a great degree of legitimacy among 
development financiers, although it cannot be asserted that both the OECD’s and the 
IFC’s principles enjoy a similar degree of legitimacy. For example, the IFC’s blended 
finance principles have been accepted by the management of the Association of European 
Development Finance Institutions and the heads of multilateral development banks. 
Whereas the blended finance principles of the OECD have not yet been acknowledged in 
a similar fashion than those of the IFC, the OECD’s soft law has been rather successful 
in influencing the content of national legislation in the past. Although these 
recommendations can be asserted to enjoy legitimacy amongst development financiers, it 
must be borne in mind that due to their non-binding nature, they can be sensitive to e.g. 
board management in DFIs and MDBs. 
In addition to legitimacy, possibilities regarding situations where these recommendations 
should be disregarded were examined. Because these soft law instruments from the 
OECD and the IFC are rooted in sustainability and are by nature rather flexible, it seems 
safe to say that they do not likely result in conflicts with other legal instruments 
development financiers (DFIs and MDBs) need to consider in their investments. In any 
case, there seems to be no apparent conflicts between blended finance soft law and the 
Paris Agreement climate finance mobilization provision, which is guided by the purpose 
of the Paris Agreement, limiting the rise of global temperature well under 2 degrees 
Celsius. I concluded this to be the case because both blended finance and the Paris 
Agreement are deeply rooted in sustainable development.  
I also asserted that whereas there remains more space for conflicts between blended 
finance soft law and other legal instruments binding upon development financiers, it 
would be unlikely that at least partly development-mandated development financiers 
would have to follow regulations that undermine sustainable development. Moreover, this 
assertation is supported by the fact that some of the notions embodied in blended finance 
principles, among which high sustainability requirements, would be anyway considered 
by development financiers.  Thus, the answer to my second research question is that 
blended finance soft law can be expected to be applied when private finance is mobilized 
by development financiers (DFIs and MDBs) for low-emission and climate-resilient 
development. This conclusion takes into account both de facto and de jure perspectives. 
The conclusion that there appears to be no situation where blended finance soft law, or 
the content embodied by it, would be disregarded is comforting. It offers some guarantees 
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for PE/VC investors that their vital concerns will be addressed in blended finance 
operations. I acknowledge that the chosen method employed in this study is not the only 
way to arrive at this conclusion. Moreover, I want to note that the relevance of blended 
finance soft law can vary between blended finance instruments alone from the reason that 
these principles highlight notions that are particularly relevant in board management, i.e. 
when development financiers invest in the same portfolio companies as PE/VC investors 
by taking junior equity positions. However, adherence to blended finance principles is far 
from offering adequate protection because these instruments do not accommodate macro 
risks faced by private equity investors in developing countries. For this reason, I 
considered how different blended finance instruments (junior equity, political risk 
insurance schemes) address different macro risks generally associated with investing in 
developing countries such as low-income countries.  
5.2 Blended finance addressing macro risks 
My third research question concerned different blended finance instruments and how they 
address macro risks generally associated with investing in developing countries. In my 
research, I considered these risks particularly from the perspective of low-income 
countries which have characteristics that make them different from more developed 
developing countries. In my study, I focused on macro risks, which I grouped into three 
groups: financial (macroeconomic), political/institutional and regulatory risks while 
acknowledging that blended finance instruments can also mitigate project risks. To 
project risks belong e.g. environmental risks, cost overruns and other risks associated with 
the project itself. Whereas in the focus of this study was not how project risks can be 
mitigated, project risk mitigation can be a practical consequence of engaging in blended 
finance. However, such conclusions cannot be made based on this study alone and should 
be examined in further research.  
In my study, I focused on two different blended finance instruments available for private 
equity investors who invest in portfolio companies abroad. I acknowledge that further 
instruments might be under development, but in this study,  I considered junior equity 
and political risk insurance schemes. Of political risk insurance schemes, I examined 
insurances offered by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). To start, 
junior equity might seem an attractive alternative for PE/VC investors engaging in 
blended finance because it offers a layer of security in situations where the portfolio 
company defaults. Because generally speaking the key objectives of PE/VC investors and 
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development financiers align, junior equity might seem a feasible option. However, junior 
equity does not offer protection against macro risks per se but rather offers protection 
against PE/VC investors’ failure to mitigate/transfer macro risks via other means, such as 
through political risk insurance schemes. 
In my research, I concluded that political/institutional risk, referring to issues related to 
political instability, corruption, and lack of strong and transparent legal systems, is 
covered by MIGA’s two coverages: i) war, terrorism & civil disturbance coverage; and 
ii) breach of contract insurance. The former might be certainly warranted in most low-
income countries, as many of them have undergone conflicts in the recent past. However, 
I acknowledge that the methods employed in this study cannot give a more sophisticated 
picture of political violence in developing countries such as low-income countries.  
The breach of contract coverage from MIGA is tricky. The most problematic issues with 
breach of contract insurance relate to the limited scope of protection – MIGA only covers 
breaches of contract by the host country and not those of third parties. Thus, when PE/VC 
investors want to use contracts to transfer risks by allocating them to third parties, these 
contractual obligations do not fall within the scope of MIGA’s breach of contract 
coverage. Because of this, MIGA does not provide means to hold up the commitments of 
third parties such as company founders. Considering that private equity investments are 
essentially contract-based in nature, this has implications for contract-based risk 
allocation through which private equity investors can transfer project risks, such as 
environmental risks. Thus, the breach of contract coverage from MIGA does not itself 
protect foreign investors from institutional weaknesses and corruption in all cases but 
only in investor-state relation. In addition, high transaction costs of breach of contract 
insurances might deter some private equity investors from resorting to this coverage from 
MIGA. Moreover, the breach of contract insurance from MIGA as a rule requires private 
investors to resort to arbitration which can be a cost risk itself especially in cases of small-
scale venture capital investments. 
Besides political/institutional risks, financial (macroeconomic) risks remain partly 
unaddressed. Currency risk, namely currency depreciation, seems to be the least-
addressed risk in developing countries, although MIGA has a currency inconvertibility 
and transfer restriction coverage. This coverage covers exactly what is in its name, but it 
does not address currency depreciation risk which has been described to be a prominent 
risk for private equity investors investing in developing countries such as low-income 
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countries. However, currency hedging options to mitigate foreign exchange risk not 
offered by development finance providers certainly exist but addressing them would have 
gone outside the scope of my research.  
MIGA’s currency inconvertibility and transfer restriction coverage also cannot be said to 
mitigate financial (macroeconomic) risks such as risks stemming from weak financial 
markets, which can translate for example into more limited exit opportunities. The fact 
that there is no protection against weak financial markets can have profitability-related 
implications for PE/VC investors for example because weak financial markets limit the 
feasibility of an initial public offering and as a consequence other, perhaps less profitable, 
exit alternatives must be used. Thus, macroeconomic risks remain one of the largest risks 
not addressed by blended finance instruments. This is a notable issue given the 
importance of macroeconomic conditions and their implications for profitability, an issue 
that has been confirmed by a study from the International Finance Corporation. Moreover, 
because climate change can amplify macroeconomic (financial) conditions, existing 
macroeconomic (financial) risks certainly warrant a closer look. Whereas blended finance 
soft law from the OECD and the IFC highlights the need to develop local financial 
markets, this cannot be concluded to mean that development financiers can mitigate 
financial (macroeconomic) risks at least within the investment horizon of PE/VC 
investors’ blended finance investments. Therefore, it can be suggested that blended 
finance instruments of the future should pay closer attention to financial 
(macroeconomic) risks, if the rise of global temperature is really wanted to be kept well 
under 2 degrees Celsius. 
As political risk insurance schemes from MIGA leave mentionable gaps in terms of 
providing protection from political/institutional and financial (macroeconomic) risks, it 
is not surprising that gaps regarding protection also against regulatory risks pertain. 
Regulatory risks cover risks such as regulatory uncertainty and inconsistent tariffs. Of 
MIGA’s political risk insurance coverages the expropriation coverage shields foreign 
investors from regulatory risks. It must be noted that MIGA’s expropriation insurance 
does not avail private equity investors from their prudency obligations, such as being 
aware of the state of regulations in the host country when making the investment. As such, 
MIGA’s expropriation coverage does not excuse lack of prudency from private equity 
investors although the degree of prudency expected by MIGA is less stringent compared 
to the expectations of arbitral tribunals. Regulatory risks pertain because MIGA’s 
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expropriation coverage is limited only to the cases of expropriations and thus leaves 
regulatory changes not qualifying as indirect expropriations outside the scope of 
protection. This is notable because only few cases count as indirect expropriations and 
the threshold for expropriations has generally been set remarkably high. It must be noted 
that this conclusion was based on the aligned definitions of indirect expropriation adopted 
by MIGA, arbitral tribunals and academics. It was not reached by examining cases 
compensated by MIGA, for which reason it cannot be asserted that the threshold of 
indirect expropriations adopted by MIGA is exactly as high as the threshold adopted by 
arbitral tribunals. Nevertheless, it can be asserted that not all regulatory changes, insured 
or not, count as indirect expropriations. Thus, regulatory changes remain a risk even when 
an expropriation coverage from MIGA is obtained by foreign investors. Regulatory risk 
is notable because regulatory changes can have significant negative effects on the value 
of the investment, and particularly companies operating in the energy sector can be 
vulnerable for regulatory changes.  
However, it must be noted that pertaining regulatory risks remain different for PE/VC 
investors engaging in blended finance compared to other private equity investors. As 
acknowledged in the very beginning of my research, tighter climate-related measures can 
be expected as countries are incorporating their pledges made under the Paris Agreement 
into their national laws. As such, regulatory risk relating to changing climate policies 
remains possible. Whereas it would be wrong to say that all regulatory risks are different 
for blended finance investors compared to other investors, it can nevertheless be asserted 
that regulatory risks regarding climate policies remain different for blended finance 
investors than most other investors. This is because development financiers require 
private investors engaging in blended finance to adhere to high sustainability standards.  
This is also because soft law instruments on blended finance require striving towards 
sustainability and high standards. Thus, it seems appropriate to suggest that private 
investors engaging in blended finance have to worry less about the compatibility of their 
investments with the Paris Agreement, which sets the direction for further, national 
regulation.  
Although tighter regulations in the climate change sector remain possible imposing e.g. 
tighter emission reduction requirements on foreign investors’ portfolio companies, it 
cannot be asserted that the most notable risk related to climate policy for blended finance 
investors is tighter regulatory risk, i.e. more stringent standards related to climate policy. 
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This is because the Paris Agreement, due to its rather soft approach, places significant 
weight on national implementation. Thus, questions regarding host countries’ ability to 
implement and enforce the Paris Agreement as well as host countries’ compliance with 
the Paris Agreement arise. For private equity investors engaging in blended finance host 
countries’ compliance with the Paris Agreement as well as their ability to properly enforce 
and implement it are relevant, because blended finance operations are built around 
sustainable development aspirations. The Paris Agreement strongly favours these 
aspirations, and as a consequence host countries’ compliance with the Paris Agreement 
is valuable for PE/VC investors investing in projects that support low-emission and 
climate-resilient development. 
Whereas host countries’ compliance with the Paris Agreement is not a black-or-white 
type of issue, the Agreement entails features aimed at enhancing compliance with the 
Paris Agreement. Whereas the exact scope of compliance with the Agreement cannot be 
predicted and whereas it cannot be predicted how well host countries can enforce or 
implement the Paris Agreement, this does not mean the issue cannot be brought up 
through other venues, namely investor-state dispute settlement. 
5.3 Suggestions for further research 
Blended finance is no panacea and as previously acknowledged, some risks pertain 
regardless of the use of blended finance instruments. An example of this is the possibility 
of a host country changing its climate policies in a way that negatively affects the value 
of the investment of the foreign investor. Nevertheless, whereas blended finance 
instruments leave open questions regarding e.g. host countries’ compliance with and their 
ability to implement/enforce the Paris Agreement, existing risks can be addressed through 
other means, a prominent avenue being investor-state dispute resolution in the case of 
regulatory risks. However, a critical remark must be presented here.  It cannot be asserted 
that resorting to investor-state arbitration mitigates risks. Rather, understanding investor-
state arbitration gives insights into possible outcomes of future arbitrations. 
As acknowledged in my research, remaining regulatory risks are very different for 
blended finance investors and other investors partly because development financiers 
require that private investors engaging in blended finance heed high sustainability 
standards. In addition, blended finance soft law underlines the importance of 
sustainability. However, it should not be taken for granted that the Paris Agreement is 
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properly implemented or enforced. This is where international investment law steps in. 
For example, failure to enforce and implement the Paris Agreement and withdrawing 
from the Agreement could be assessed under the fair and equitable treatment standard. 
Similarly, host countries changing their regulations could result in situations which could 
be assessed in light of the fair and equitable treatment standard. Whereas investors might 
not receive compensation on the basis of occurred expropriation, compensation can be 
obtained on other grounds, for example because a host country government was in breach 
of the fair and equitable treatment standard. 
In addition to the links between pertaining regulatory risks and international investment 
law, future research could focus, for example, on the ability of blended finance 
instruments to mitigate or transfer project risks. This research has identified some gaps in 
the protection offered by development financiers against regulatory, political/institutional 
and financial (macroeconomic) risks. I have acknowledged that blended finance 
instruments such as junior equity and political risk insurance schemes can mitigate or 
transfer project risks such as environmental risks and cost overruns. I have also 
acknowledged that gaps in protection against macro risks might have implications also 
for mitigating/transferring project risks. An example of this is the limited scope of 
MIGA’s breach of contract insurance, which does not help to uphold contracts in the 
relation between a foreign investor and non-state parties. Thus, future research could 
focus on clarifying the extent to which development financiers can mitigate/transfer 
project risks through blended finance instruments. 
This study has provided an overview of blended finance that is essentially based on 
environmental law and international law. I acknowledge that addressing the topic from a 
company law viewpoint could provide new insights into blended finance. Although 
blended finance is no panacea and leaves certain aspects of macro risks unaddressed, it 
nevertheless is a step in the right direction of attracting more private finance into low-
emission and climate-resilient development in developing countries. In its current form, 
blended finance addresses some concerns of private equity investors related to macro 
risks, but more work must be done to make blended finance a truly promising alternative. 
In particular, macroeconomic conditions of the poorest developing countries should be 
strengthened to meet the remaining infrastructure investment gap. Bridging the 
infrastructure gap and keeping the rise of global temperature well under 2 degrees Celsius 
is achievable if more conscious effort is put in. 
